Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy / James H. Lebovic.
Material type: TextPublisher: New York, NY :  Columbia University Press,  [1990]Copyright date: ©1990Description: 1 online resource (252 p.)Content type:
TextPublisher: New York, NY :  Columbia University Press,  [1990]Copyright date: ©1990Description: 1 online resource (252 p.)Content type: - 9780231908122
- 9780231880619
- online - DeGruyter
| Item type | Current library | Call number | URL | Status | Notes | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  eBook | Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online | online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Online access | Not for loan (Accesso limitato) | Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users | (dgr)9780231880619 | 
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Psychology of Foreign Policy Goal Formation -- 2. Strategic Assessment -- 3. Strategic Action -- 4. Strategic Objectives and Weapon Deployments -- 5. Strategic Processes: Rationality and Nonrationality -- 6. Concluding Thoughts on Achieving Nuclear Consensus -- Notes -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index
restricted access online access with authorization star
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Addresses the socio-political dilemma of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Specifically examines the psychology of foreign policy goal formation and achieving nuclear consensus, as well as strategic action, assessment, objectives, weapon deployments, and processes. .
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)


