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Game Theory for Political Scientists / James D. Morrow.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2020]Copyright date: ©1995Description: 1 online resource (400 p.) : 127 figs. 4 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691213200
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 320/.01/5193
LOC classification:
  • JA73 .M67 1994eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES -- PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter One. Overview -- Chapter Two. Utility Theory -- Chapter Three. Specifying a Game -- Chapter Four. Classical Game Theory -- Chapter Five. Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection -- Chapter Six. Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria -- Chapter Seven. More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria -- Chapter Eight. Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs -- Chapter Nine. Repeated Games -- Chapter Ten. Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? -- Appendix One: Basic Mathematical Knowledge -- Appendix Two: Answers to Selected Problems -- NOTES -- GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN GAME THEORY -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX
Summary: Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780691213200

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES -- PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter One. Overview -- Chapter Two. Utility Theory -- Chapter Three. Specifying a Game -- Chapter Four. Classical Game Theory -- Chapter Five. Solving Extensive-Form Games: Backwards Induction and Subgame Perfection -- Chapter Six. Beliefs and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria -- Chapter Seven. More on Noncooperative Equilibrium: Perfect and Sequential Equilibria -- Chapter Eight. Games of Limited Information and Restrictions on Beliefs -- Chapter Nine. Repeated Games -- Chapter Ten. Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? -- Appendix One: Basic Mathematical Knowledge -- Appendix Two: Answers to Selected Problems -- NOTES -- GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN GAME THEORY -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

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Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)