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Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion : Social Sector Reform in Latin America / Kurt Weyland.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2009]Copyright date: ©2007Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (312 p.) : 2 line illusContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691134710
  • 9781400828067
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • RE/361.61098 23
LOC classification:
  • HN110.5.A8 W44 2006
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Policy Diffusion -- Chapter 2. Toward a New Theory of Policy Diffusion -- Chapter 3. External Pressures and International Norms in Pension Reform -- Chapter 4. Cognitive Heuristics in the Diffusion of Pension Reform -- Chapter 5. External Pressures and International Norms in Health Reform -- Chapter 6. Cognitive Heuristics in the Diffusion of Health Reform -- Chapter 7. Bounded Rationality in the Era of Globalization -- References and Interviews -- Index
Summary: Why do very different countries often emulate the same policy model? Two years after Ronald Reagan's income-tax simplification of 1986, Brazil adopted a similar reform even though it threatened to exacerbate income disparity and jeopardize state revenues. And Chile's pension privatization of the early 1980s has spread throughout Latin America and beyond even though many poor countries that have privatized their social security systems, including Bolivia and El Salvador, lack some of the preconditions necessary to do so successfully. In a major step beyond conventional rational-choice accounts of policy decision-making, this book demonstrates that bounded--not full--rationality drives the spread of innovations across countries. When seeking solutions to domestic problems, decision-makers often consider foreign models, sometimes promoted by development institutions like the World Bank. But, as Kurt Weyland argues, policymakers apply inferential shortcuts at the risk of distortions and biases. Through an in-depth analysis of pension and health reform in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Peru, Weyland demonstrates that decision-makers are captivated by neat, bold, cognitively available models. And rather than thoroughly assessing the costs and benefits of external models, they draw excessively firm conclusions from limited data and overextrapolate from spurts of success or failure. Indications of initial success can thus trigger an upsurge of policy diffusion.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400828067

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Policy Diffusion -- Chapter 2. Toward a New Theory of Policy Diffusion -- Chapter 3. External Pressures and International Norms in Pension Reform -- Chapter 4. Cognitive Heuristics in the Diffusion of Pension Reform -- Chapter 5. External Pressures and International Norms in Health Reform -- Chapter 6. Cognitive Heuristics in the Diffusion of Health Reform -- Chapter 7. Bounded Rationality in the Era of Globalization -- References and Interviews -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Why do very different countries often emulate the same policy model? Two years after Ronald Reagan's income-tax simplification of 1986, Brazil adopted a similar reform even though it threatened to exacerbate income disparity and jeopardize state revenues. And Chile's pension privatization of the early 1980s has spread throughout Latin America and beyond even though many poor countries that have privatized their social security systems, including Bolivia and El Salvador, lack some of the preconditions necessary to do so successfully. In a major step beyond conventional rational-choice accounts of policy decision-making, this book demonstrates that bounded--not full--rationality drives the spread of innovations across countries. When seeking solutions to domestic problems, decision-makers often consider foreign models, sometimes promoted by development institutions like the World Bank. But, as Kurt Weyland argues, policymakers apply inferential shortcuts at the risk of distortions and biases. Through an in-depth analysis of pension and health reform in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Peru, Weyland demonstrates that decision-makers are captivated by neat, bold, cognitively available models. And rather than thoroughly assessing the costs and benefits of external models, they draw excessively firm conclusions from limited data and overextrapolate from spurts of success or failure. Indications of initial success can thus trigger an upsurge of policy diffusion.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)