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Real Existence, Ideal Necessity : Kant's Compromise, and the Modalities without the Compromise / Robert Greenberg.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte ; 157Publisher: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2008]Copyright date: ©2008Description: 1 online resource (211 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9783110206906
  • 9783110210132
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 121.092 22
LOC classification:
  • B2750 .K28 no. 157eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Inhalt -- Preface -- Chapter 1 – General Review -- Part I: Existence -- Chapter 2 – How Our Knowledge Begins -- Chapter 3 – A Criterion of Existence in General -- Chapter 4 – Sensation and Existence -- Chapter 5 – Presupposition and Existence -- Part II: Necessity -- Chapter 6 – Kant’s Referential Ambiguity -- Chapter 7 – Kaplan’s Referential Ambiguity -- Chapter 8 – Kaplan’s Interpretation Adapted to Kant -- Chapter 9 – Geometry and Causality -- Chapter 10 – Presupposition and Real Necessity -- Chapter 11 – Derivations of the Real Modalities -- Chapter 12 – Conclusion -- Backmatter
Summary: Analytic philosophy has leveled many challenges to Kant’s ascription of necessary properties and relations to objects in his Critique of Pure Reason. Some of these challenges can be answered, it is argued here, largely in terms of techniques belonging to analytic philosophy itself, in particular, to its philosophy of language. This Kantian response is the primary objective of this book. It takes the form of a compromise between the real existence of the objects that we can intuit and that get our knowledge started – dubbed initiators – and the ideality of the necessary properties and relations that Kant ascribes to our sensible representations of initiators, which he entitles appearances. Whereas the real existence of initiators is independent of us and our senses, the necessity of these properties and relations of appearances is due to their origins in the mind. The Kantian compromise between real existence and ideal necessity is formulated in terms of David Kaplan’s interpretation of de re necessity in his article, “Quantifying In” – his response to Quine’s concern that a commitment to such a necessity leads to an acceptance of an unwanted traditional Aristotelian essentialism. In addition, the book first abstracts and then departs from its interpretation of Kant to provide a realistic account of the relation between existence and de re necessity.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9783110210132

Frontmatter -- Inhalt -- Preface -- Chapter 1 – General Review -- Part I: Existence -- Chapter 2 – How Our Knowledge Begins -- Chapter 3 – A Criterion of Existence in General -- Chapter 4 – Sensation and Existence -- Chapter 5 – Presupposition and Existence -- Part II: Necessity -- Chapter 6 – Kant’s Referential Ambiguity -- Chapter 7 – Kaplan’s Referential Ambiguity -- Chapter 8 – Kaplan’s Interpretation Adapted to Kant -- Chapter 9 – Geometry and Causality -- Chapter 10 – Presupposition and Real Necessity -- Chapter 11 – Derivations of the Real Modalities -- Chapter 12 – Conclusion -- Backmatter

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Analytic philosophy has leveled many challenges to Kant’s ascription of necessary properties and relations to objects in his Critique of Pure Reason. Some of these challenges can be answered, it is argued here, largely in terms of techniques belonging to analytic philosophy itself, in particular, to its philosophy of language. This Kantian response is the primary objective of this book. It takes the form of a compromise between the real existence of the objects that we can intuit and that get our knowledge started – dubbed initiators – and the ideality of the necessary properties and relations that Kant ascribes to our sensible representations of initiators, which he entitles appearances. Whereas the real existence of initiators is independent of us and our senses, the necessity of these properties and relations of appearances is due to their origins in the mind. The Kantian compromise between real existence and ideal necessity is formulated in terms of David Kaplan’s interpretation of de re necessity in his article, “Quantifying In” – his response to Quine’s concern that a commitment to such a necessity leads to an acceptance of an unwanted traditional Aristotelian essentialism. In addition, the book first abstracts and then departs from its interpretation of Kant to provide a realistic account of the relation between existence and de re necessity.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 28. Feb 2023)