Institutions and Economic Performance /
Institutions and Economic Performance /
ed. by Elhanan Helpman.
- 1 online resource (624 p.)
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I History -- 1 The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation -- 2 The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution -- 3 Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain -- 4 Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis -- 5 Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia -- II Theory -- 6 The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism -- 7 Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War -- 8 Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics -- 9 Policy Persistence in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies -- III Contemporary Evidence -- 10 Formalizing Informal Institutions -- 11 Making Autocracy Work -- 12 Democracy, Technology, and Growth -- 13 The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated? -- List of Contributors -- Author Index -- Subject Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of economic and political elites, informal institutions that promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two core themes run through the contributors’ essays. First, what constraints do institutions place on the power of the executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics, political science, history, and sociology to address its central question.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780674038578
10.4159/9780674038578 doi
Economic development.
Political culture.
Public administration.
Regional economic disparities.
Social institutions.
Social structure.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / International / General.
HD82 / .I347 2008eb
338.9
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- I History -- 1 The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation -- 2 The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution -- 3 Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain -- 4 Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis -- 5 Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia -- II Theory -- 6 The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism -- 7 Economic Development, Insurgency, and Civil War -- 8 Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics -- 9 Policy Persistence in Multiparty Parliamentary Democracies -- III Contemporary Evidence -- 10 Formalizing Informal Institutions -- 11 Making Autocracy Work -- 12 Democracy, Technology, and Growth -- 13 The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated? -- List of Contributors -- Author Index -- Subject Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of economic and political elites, informal institutions that promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two core themes run through the contributors’ essays. First, what constraints do institutions place on the power of the executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics, political science, history, and sociology to address its central question.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780674038578
10.4159/9780674038578 doi
Economic development.
Political culture.
Public administration.
Regional economic disparities.
Social institutions.
Social structure.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / International / General.
HD82 / .I347 2008eb
338.9