Political Leadership and Collective Goods /
Frohlich, Norman
Political Leadership and Collective Goods / Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer. - 1 online resource (180 p.) - Princeton Legacy Library ; 1298 .
Frontmatter -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- CHAPTER ONE. Noncompetitive Politics -- CHAPTER TWO. The Consequences of Noncompetitive Politics -- CHAPTER THREE. Competitive Politics -- CHAPTER FOUR. Some Consequences of Political Competition -- CHAPTER FIVE. Strategic Interaction -- CHAPTER SIX. Conclusion -- APPENDIX 1. The Size of Groups -- APPENDIX 2. Table of Symbols -- APPENDIX 3. Table of Equations -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods-defense, law and order, clean air, highways.Originally published in 1971.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691620572 9781400872411
10.1515/9781400872411 doi
Economics.
Political leadership.
SOCIAL SCIENCE / Sociology / General.
JA77
301.5/92
Political Leadership and Collective Goods / Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer. - 1 online resource (180 p.) - Princeton Legacy Library ; 1298 .
Frontmatter -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- CHAPTER ONE. Noncompetitive Politics -- CHAPTER TWO. The Consequences of Noncompetitive Politics -- CHAPTER THREE. Competitive Politics -- CHAPTER FOUR. Some Consequences of Political Competition -- CHAPTER FIVE. Strategic Interaction -- CHAPTER SIX. Conclusion -- APPENDIX 1. The Size of Groups -- APPENDIX 2. Table of Symbols -- APPENDIX 3. Table of Equations -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Using the assumptions of rationality and self-interest common to economic analysis, Professors Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young develop a profit-making theory of political behavior as it pertains to the supply of collective goods-defense, law and order, clean air, highways.Originally published in 1971.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691620572 9781400872411
10.1515/9781400872411 doi
Economics.
Political leadership.
SOCIAL SCIENCE / Sociology / General.
JA77
301.5/92