Matching with Transfers : The Economics of Love and Marriage /
Chiappori, Pierre-André
Matching with Transfers : The Economics of Love and Marriage / Pierre-André Chiappori. - 1 online resource (264 p.) : 36 line illus. 2 tables. - The Gorman Lectures in Economics ; 7 .
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction: Matching Models in Economics -- 2. Matching with Transfers: Basic Notions -- 3. Matching under Transferable Utility: Theory -- 4. Matching by Categories -- 5. Matching under Transferable Utility: Some Extensions -- 6. Matching under Transferable Utility: Applications -- 7. Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility -- 8. Conclusion -- References -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691171739 9781400885732
10.1515/9781400885732 doi
Families--Economic aspects.
Marriage--Economic aspects.
Matching theory.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory.
Becker-Coase theorem. Choo-Siow model. Gale-Shapley algorithm. Low model. Pareto weights. Roe v. Wade. Spence-Mirrlees condition. abortion. allocation. applied economics. assortative matching. bargaining models. birth control. comparative statics. cupid framework. divorce. econometrics. education. equilibrium. family economics. family formation. female empowerment. gender differences. hedonic equilibrium. hedonic models. heterogeneity. heterogeneous products. heteroskedasticity. higher education. household behavior. imperfectly transferable utility. income. individual utilities. inequality. intrafamily allocation. intrahousehold allocation. labor markets. marriage market. marriage. matching models. matching. metric spaces. multidimensional matching. nontransferable utility. optimal transportation. organ donations. positive assortative matching. preinvestment. remarriage. risk sharing. roommate matching. separability assumption. stability. supermodularity. transferable utility. transfers. wages.
HQ519
306.85
Matching with Transfers : The Economics of Love and Marriage / Pierre-André Chiappori. - 1 online resource (264 p.) : 36 line illus. 2 tables. - The Gorman Lectures in Economics ; 7 .
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction: Matching Models in Economics -- 2. Matching with Transfers: Basic Notions -- 3. Matching under Transferable Utility: Theory -- 4. Matching by Categories -- 5. Matching under Transferable Utility: Some Extensions -- 6. Matching under Transferable Utility: Applications -- 7. Matching under Imperfectly Transferable Utility -- 8. Conclusion -- References -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691171739 9781400885732
10.1515/9781400885732 doi
Families--Economic aspects.
Marriage--Economic aspects.
Matching theory.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Theory.
Becker-Coase theorem. Choo-Siow model. Gale-Shapley algorithm. Low model. Pareto weights. Roe v. Wade. Spence-Mirrlees condition. abortion. allocation. applied economics. assortative matching. bargaining models. birth control. comparative statics. cupid framework. divorce. econometrics. education. equilibrium. family economics. family formation. female empowerment. gender differences. hedonic equilibrium. hedonic models. heterogeneity. heterogeneous products. heteroskedasticity. higher education. household behavior. imperfectly transferable utility. income. individual utilities. inequality. intrafamily allocation. intrahousehold allocation. labor markets. marriage market. marriage. matching models. matching. metric spaces. multidimensional matching. nontransferable utility. optimal transportation. organ donations. positive assortative matching. preinvestment. remarriage. risk sharing. roommate matching. separability assumption. stability. supermodularity. transferable utility. transfers. wages.
HQ519
306.85