Property Possession as Identity : An Essay in Metaphysics /
Monaghan, Patrick X.
Property Possession as Identity : An Essay in Metaphysics / Patrick X. Monaghan. - 1 online resource (191 p.) - Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , 41 2198-2066 ; .
Frontmatter -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER II: AGAINST INTERNALISM -- CHAPTER III: AGAINST EXTERNALISM -- CHAPTER IV: THE VIEW OF PLATO -- CHAPTER V: AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS -- CHAPTER VI: PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY -- CHAPTER VII: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- Backmatter
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110325089 9783110325744
10.1515/9783110325744 doi
Identity (Philosophical concept).
Metaphysics.
Ontologie.
Philosophie.
analytische Philosophie.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
BD236 / .M66 2011eb
Property Possession as Identity : An Essay in Metaphysics / Patrick X. Monaghan. - 1 online resource (191 p.) - Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , 41 2198-2066 ; .
Frontmatter -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER II: AGAINST INTERNALISM -- CHAPTER III: AGAINST EXTERNALISM -- CHAPTER IV: THE VIEW OF PLATO -- CHAPTER V: AGAINST HYBRID VIEWS -- CHAPTER VI: PROPERTY POSSESSION AS IDENTITY -- CHAPTER VII: OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- Backmatter
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110325089 9783110325744
10.1515/9783110325744 doi
Identity (Philosophical concept).
Metaphysics.
Ontologie.
Philosophie.
analytische Philosophie.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
BD236 / .M66 2011eb