Foundations of an Ethics of Belief /
Meylan, Anne
Foundations of an Ethics of Belief / Anne Meylan. - 1 online resource (218 p.) - Practical Philosophy , 15 2197-9243 ; .
Frontmatter -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1: WHAT THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION TEACHES US -- CHAPTER 2: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIRECTLY ACQUIRING BELIEFS FOR REASONS -- CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL AND PASCALIAN CONTROL -- CHAPTER 4: DOXASTIC RESPONSIBILITY AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES -- CHAPTER 5: EPISTEMIC PRAISEWORTHINESS AND BLAMEWORTHINESS -- CHAPTER 6: BEYOND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFIEDNESS -- CHAPTER 7: EPISTEMIC AND NON-EPISTEMIC JUSTIFIEDNESS -- CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
In our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand, too, that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The goal of this study is to illustrate the foundations that allow for these kinds of judgments.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110327441 9783110327816
10.1515/9783110327816 doi
Ethics.
Social ethics.
Metaethik.
Werturteile.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
Metaethics. Value Judgments.
234.2
Foundations of an Ethics of Belief / Anne Meylan. - 1 online resource (218 p.) - Practical Philosophy , 15 2197-9243 ; .
Frontmatter -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 1: WHAT THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION TEACHES US -- CHAPTER 2: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DIRECTLY ACQUIRING BELIEFS FOR REASONS -- CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL AND PASCALIAN CONTROL -- CHAPTER 4: DOXASTIC RESPONSIBILITY AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES -- CHAPTER 5: EPISTEMIC PRAISEWORTHINESS AND BLAMEWORTHINESS -- CHAPTER 6: BEYOND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFIEDNESS -- CHAPTER 7: EPISTEMIC AND NON-EPISTEMIC JUSTIFIEDNESS -- CONCLUSION -- BIBLIOGRAPHY
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
In our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand, too, that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The goal of this study is to illustrate the foundations that allow for these kinds of judgments.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110327441 9783110327816
10.1515/9783110327816 doi
Ethics.
Social ethics.
Metaethik.
Werturteile.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
Metaethics. Value Judgments.
234.2