Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? /
Hess, Markus Patrick
Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? / Markus Patrick Hess. - 1 online resource (165 p.) - Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind , 17 2198-1884 ; .
Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- 3. The Value of Truth -- 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- 6. Alternative Monism -- 7. The Value of Knowledge -- 8. Conclusion -- 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- Bibliography
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110329384 9783110329551
10.1515/9783110329551 doi
Goal (Philosophy).
Knowledge, Theory of.
Truth--Philosophy.
Erkenntnistheorie.
Philosophie.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
BD171 / .H47 2010
121
Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? / Markus Patrick Hess. - 1 online resource (165 p.) - Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind , 17 2198-1884 ; .
Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- 3. The Value of Truth -- 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- 6. Alternative Monism -- 7. The Value of Knowledge -- 8. Conclusion -- 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- Bibliography
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9783110329384 9783110329551
10.1515/9783110329551 doi
Goal (Philosophy).
Knowledge, Theory of.
Truth--Philosophy.
Erkenntnistheorie.
Philosophie.
PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / General.
BD171 / .H47 2010
121