Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

Preface; 1. Introduction; I. David Wong's Pluralistic Moral Relativism; 1. The Strategy and Style of Wong's Approach: Working Out a Defensible Relativism; 2. The Three Main Theses of Wong's Pluralistic Relativism; 3. Wong's Defense of Pluralistic Relativism; 4. Wong's Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy; II. Central Issues between Wong and His Critics; 1. A Morality of Humanity Over and Above Moralities of Social Groups?

2. Can a Metaethics that Is Naturalistic, Pluralistic, and Relativistic Accommodate a Normative Morality that Is Non-Naturalistic, Monistic, or Universalistic Morality?3. The Principle of Humanity vs. the Principle of Charity: Interpretation of Confucianism; 4. Naturalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy; 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and Realism; 6. Speaker Relativism or Patient Relativism?; Notes; References; Part I: Critical Essays; 2. Human Morality, Naturalism, and Accommodation; I. Wong's Pluralistic Relativism; II. The Universal Element in Morality; III. Relativism; IV. Accommodation.

v. ConclusionNotes; References; 3. Naturalism and Pluralistic Relativism; I. Introduction; II. Individuating Moralities; III. From Moral Ambivalence to Pluralistic Relativism?; IV. Value Monism and Universalism Revisited; V. Should Wong Allow Non-Naturalistic Moralities to be Adequate?; VI. Moralities as Practiced Versus Ideal Moralities; VII. A Problem for Wong's Reciprocity Constraint; VIII. Wong's Use of Xunzi: A Separate Naturalistic Project?; Acknowledgment; Notes; References; 4. Principle of Humanity vs. Principle of Charity; I. The Argument.

II. The Rival Principles of Humanity and Charity in Radical TranslationIII. The Role of Comparative Philosophy in the Argument; IV. Xunzi and Sage Authority; V. Mencius and Ambivalence about Principles; VI. Zhuangzi: Detachment and Moral Engagement; VII. Conclusion: Tolerance, Accommodation, and Openness; Acknowledgments; References; 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and the Authority of Morality; I. Wong's Pluralistic Relativism; II. Questions about the Universally Valid Criteria of Morality; III. Questions about the Locally Contingent Criteria of Morality; Notes; References.

6. The Metaphysics and Semantics of Moral RelativismI. Moral Relativism and Moral Realism; II. Moral Disagreements and Moral Relativism; Notes; References; 7. Toward a Benign Moral Relativism: From the Agent/Appraiser-Centered to the Patient-Centered; I. Problems with Relativism without Constraints; II. How Wong's Pluralist Relativism Avoids these Problems; III. Toward a Patient-Centered Moral Relativism; Notes; References; Part II: David Wong's Responses to Critics; 8. Response to Blum; Reference; 9. Response to Geisz and Sadler; Notes; References; 10. Response to Hansen; Notes; References.

A wide-ranging consideration of the work of contemporary ethicist David Wong. Original, influential, and often controversial, ethicist David Wong defends forms of moral relativism. His 1984 Moral Relativity was a study of this concept, and his 2006 Natural Moralities presented a new and sophisticated account of it. Wong's vision is of a pluralistic moral relativism; he does not defend all forms of relativism but evaluates what moralities may be true. His singular philosophy reflects his deep knowledge of Confucian and Daoist thought. In this book, moral philosophers and scholars of Chinese thought debate ideas central to Wong's work and Wong responds to them. The discussion ranges widely, including exploring Wong's thought on naturalism, criteria for moralities, the principle of charity, moral authority, and the concept of community, and looking at his readings of Xunzi and Zhuangzi. Wong's nuanced and forceful responses clarify and develop further arguments in his work. These engaging and critical exchanges between Wong and his critics illuminate not only Wong's thought, but also contemporary ethical theory and Chinese philosophy.