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Armed Servants : Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations / Peter D. Feaver.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2009]Copyright date: ©2005Description: 1 online resource (400 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780674036772
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 322.50973
LOC classification:
  • JK330 -- F43 2003eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction -- CHAPTER 2. Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle -- CHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory -- CHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations -- CHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle -- CHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post–Cold War “Crisis,” 1990–2000 -- CHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era -- CHAPTER 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index
Summary: How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780674036772

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction -- CHAPTER 2. Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle -- CHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory -- CHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations -- CHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle -- CHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post–Cold War “Crisis,” 1990–2000 -- CHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era -- CHAPTER 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)