Aspects of Psychologism / Tim Crane.
Material type: TextPublisher: Cambridge, MA :  Harvard University Press,  [2014]Copyright date: ©2014Description: 1 online resource (384 p.) : 1 line illustrationContent type:
TextPublisher: Cambridge, MA :  Harvard University Press,  [2014]Copyright date: ©2014Description: 1 online resource (384 p.) : 1 line illustrationContent type: - 9780674724570
- 9780674726581
- 150.1 23
- BF41 .C73 2014eb
- online - DeGruyter
- Issued also in print.
| Item type | Current library | Call number | URL | Status | Notes | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  eBook | Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online | online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Online access | Not for loan (Accesso limitato) | Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users | (dgr)9780674726581 | 
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- ESSAY ONE. Introduction: In Defence of Psychologism -- I Historical Essays -- II Intentionality -- III Perception -- IV Consciousness -- Notes -- References -- Credits -- Index
restricted access online access with authorization star
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.
Issued also in print.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)


