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No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / James Doyle.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2017Description: 1 online resource (224 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780674982819
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 126 23
LOC classification:
  • B1618.A574 .D695 2018
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index
Summary: Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780674982819

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index

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Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 24. Aug 2021)