Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions / H. Peyton Young.
Material type:
- 9780691214252
- Evolutionary economics
- Game theory
- Institutional economics
- Social institutions
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History
- Blume, Larry
- Gibbs distribution
- Hofbauer, Josef
- Hurkens, Sjaak
- Kandori, Michihiro
- Kreps, David
- Levine, David
- Malouf, Michael
- Nash, John
- Owen, Guillermo
- Schumpeter, Joseph
- alternating offers model
- basin of attraction
- chicken game
- disequilibrium
- ergodic process
- fashion game
- finite improvement path
- interpersonal comparisons
- local conformity
- marriage game
- mode of a distribution
- noise models
- payoffs
- proposal game
- risk factor
- roles in a game
- social capital
- successor state
- vector field
- 306 22
- online - DeGruyter
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Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online | online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Online access | Not for loan (Accesso limitato) | Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users | (dgr)9780691214252 |
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Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1. OVERVIEW -- Chapter 2. LEARNING -- Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY -- Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES -- Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS -- Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION -- Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES -- Chapter 8. BARGAINING -- Chapter 9. CONTRACTS -- Chapter 10. CONCLUSION -- Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS -- NOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX
restricted access online access with authorization star
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)