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Does Conquest Pay? : The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies / Peter Liberman.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; 74Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [1998]Copyright date: ©1995Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (264 p.) : 4 line illus. 26 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691002422
  • 9781400821747
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 325.320904 325/.32/0904
LOC classification:
  • JX5003
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Does Conquest Pay? -- Chapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay? -- Chapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- Chapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- Chapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- Chapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- Chapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- Chapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index
Summary: Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400821747

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Does Conquest Pay? -- Chapter 2. When Does Conquest Pay? -- Chapter 3. Nazi-Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- Chapter 4. Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- Chapter 5. The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- Chapter 6. The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- Chapter 7. The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- Chapter 8. The Spoils of Conquest -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Can foreign invaders successfully exploit industrial economies? Since control over economic resources is a key source of power, the answer affects the likelihood of aggression and how strenuously states should counter it. The resurgence of nationalism has led many policymakers and scholars to doubt that conquest still pays. But, until now, the "cumulativity" of industrial resources has never been subjected to systematic analysis. Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international system is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)