Library Catalog
Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

Self-Deception Unmasked / Alfred R. Mele.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Princeton Monographs in Philosophy ; 6Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2000]Copyright date: ©2001Edition: Core TextbookDescription: 1 online resourceContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691057453
  • 9781400823970
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 128/.3 21
LOC classification:
  • BD439 .M45 2001eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles, Biases and Agency -- CHAPTER 2. Garden-Variety Straight Self-Deception: Some Psychological Processes -- CHAPTER 3. Self-Deception without Puzzles -- CHAPTER 4. Attempted Empirical Demonstrations of Strict Self-Deception -- CHAPTER 5. Twisted Self-Deception -- CHAPTER 6. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index
Summary: Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400823970

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER 1. Introduction: Approaches, Puzzles, Biases and Agency -- CHAPTER 2. Garden-Variety Straight Self-Deception: Some Psychological Processes -- CHAPTER 3. Self-Deception without Puzzles -- CHAPTER 4. Attempted Empirical Demonstrations of Strict Self-Deception -- CHAPTER 5. Twisted Self-Deception -- CHAPTER 6. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)