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Political Power and Corporate Control : The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance / James Shinn, Peter A. Gourevitch.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2010]Copyright date: ©2005Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (368 p.) : 23 line illus. 53 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691133812
  • 9781400837014
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338.6
LOC classification:
  • HD2741 -- G677 2005eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS -- PREFACE -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction and Summary Argument -- CHAPTER TWO. Governance Patterns: What Causes What? -- CHAPTER THREE. Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition -- CHAPTER FOUR. Politics: Preferences and Institutions -- CHAPTER FIVE. Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict -- CHAPTER SIX. Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Conclusion: Going Forward -- Data Appendix -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX
Summary: Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400837014

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS -- PREFACE -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction and Summary Argument -- CHAPTER TWO. Governance Patterns: What Causes What? -- CHAPTER THREE. Framing Incentives: The Economics and Law Tradition -- CHAPTER FOUR. Politics: Preferences and Institutions -- CHAPTER FIVE. Preference Cleavages 1: Class Conflict -- CHAPTER SIX. Preference Cleavages 2: Sectoral Conflict -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Preference Cleavages 3: Transparency, Voice, and Pensions -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Conclusion: Going Forward -- Data Appendix -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)