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Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation : A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment / Nathan M. Jensen.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2008]Copyright date: ©2006Edition: Core TextbookDescription: 1 online resource (224 p.) : 6 line illus. 23 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691136363
  • 9781400837373
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338.88
LOC classification:
  • HG4538
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Multinational Firms and Domestic Governments -- Chapter 3. Theory -- Chapter 4. The Race to the Bottom Thesis and FDI -- Chapter 5. Democracy and FDI -- Chapter 6. Veto Players and FDI -- Chapter 7. The IMF and FDI Inflows -- Chapter 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index
Summary: What makes a country attractive to foreign investors? To what extent do conditions of governance and politics matter? This book provides the most systematic exploration to date of these crucial questions at the nexus of politics and economics. Using quantitative data and interviews with investment promotion agencies, investment location consultants, political risk insurers, and decision makers at multinational corporations, Nathan Jensen arrives at a surprising conclusion: Countries may be competing for international capital, but government fiscal policy--both taxation and spending--has little impact on multinationals' investment decisions. Although government policy has a limited ability to determine patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, political institutions are central to explaining why some countries are more successful in attracting international capital. First, democratic institutions lower political risks for multinational corporations. Indeed, they lead to massive amounts of foreign direct investment. Second, politically federal institutions, in contrast to fiscally federal institutions, lower political risks for multinationals and allow host countries to attract higher levels of FDI inflows. Third, the International Monetary Fund, often cited as a catalyst for promoting foreign investment, actually deters multinationals from investment in countries under IMF programs. Even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements are associated with much lower levels of FDI inflows.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400837373

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Multinational Firms and Domestic Governments -- Chapter 3. Theory -- Chapter 4. The Race to the Bottom Thesis and FDI -- Chapter 5. Democracy and FDI -- Chapter 6. Veto Players and FDI -- Chapter 7. The IMF and FDI Inflows -- Chapter 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

What makes a country attractive to foreign investors? To what extent do conditions of governance and politics matter? This book provides the most systematic exploration to date of these crucial questions at the nexus of politics and economics. Using quantitative data and interviews with investment promotion agencies, investment location consultants, political risk insurers, and decision makers at multinational corporations, Nathan Jensen arrives at a surprising conclusion: Countries may be competing for international capital, but government fiscal policy--both taxation and spending--has little impact on multinationals' investment decisions. Although government policy has a limited ability to determine patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, political institutions are central to explaining why some countries are more successful in attracting international capital. First, democratic institutions lower political risks for multinational corporations. Indeed, they lead to massive amounts of foreign direct investment. Second, politically federal institutions, in contrast to fiscally federal institutions, lower political risks for multinationals and allow host countries to attract higher levels of FDI inflows. Third, the International Monetary Fund, often cited as a catalyst for promoting foreign investment, actually deters multinationals from investment in countries under IMF programs. Even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements are associated with much lower levels of FDI inflows.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)