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Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements / Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2012]Copyright date: ©2012Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (224 p.) : 11 line illus. 15 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691135298
  • 9781400842537
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 382/.9 23
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Commonly Used Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements -- Chapter 3. Systemic Influences on PTA Formation -- Chapter 4. Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation -- Chapter 5. Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements -- Chapter 6. Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400842537

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Commonly Used Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements -- Chapter 3. Systemic Influences on PTA Formation -- Chapter 4. Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation -- Chapter 5. Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements -- Chapter 6. Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)