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Blind Oracles : Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger / Bruce Kuklick.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2013]Copyright date: ©2007Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (264 p.) : 9 halftonesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691133874
  • 9781400849468
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 327.73 22
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Note on Citations -- INTRODUCTION. The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge -- CHAPTER 1. Scientific Management and War, 1910-1960 -- CHAPTER 2. Theorists of War, 1945-1953 -- CHAPTER 3. RAND in Opposition, 1946-1961 -- CHAPTER 4. Accented and Unaccented Realism, 1946-1961 -- CHAPTER 5. RAND and the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1962 -- CHAPTER 6. Cuba and Nassau, 1962 -- CHAPTER 7. Intellectuals in Power, 1961-1966 -- CHAPTER 8. The Kennedy School of Government, 1964-1971 -- CHAPTER 9. The Pentagon Papers -- CHAPTER 10. Henry Kissinger -- CHAPTER 11. Diplomats on Foreign Policy, 1976-2001 -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments and Methodological Note -- Index
Summary: In this trenchant analysis, historian Bruce Kuklick examines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. He recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The book looks at how the country's foremost thinkers advanced their ideas during this time of United States expansionism, a period that culminated in the Vietnam War and détente with the Soviets. Beginning with George Kennan after World War II, and concluding with Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War, Kuklick examines the role of both institutional policymakers such as those at The Rand Corporation and Harvard's Kennedy School, and individual thinkers including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow. Kuklick contends that the figures having the most influence on American strategy--Kissinger, for example--clearly understood the way politics and the exercise of power affects policymaking. Other brilliant thinkers, on the other hand, often played a minor role, providing, at best, a rationale for policies adopted for political reasons. At a time when the role of the neoconservatives' influence over American foreign policy is a subject of intense debate, this book offers important insight into the function of intellectuals in foreign policymaking.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Note on Citations -- INTRODUCTION. The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge -- CHAPTER 1. Scientific Management and War, 1910-1960 -- CHAPTER 2. Theorists of War, 1945-1953 -- CHAPTER 3. RAND in Opposition, 1946-1961 -- CHAPTER 4. Accented and Unaccented Realism, 1946-1961 -- CHAPTER 5. RAND and the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1962 -- CHAPTER 6. Cuba and Nassau, 1962 -- CHAPTER 7. Intellectuals in Power, 1961-1966 -- CHAPTER 8. The Kennedy School of Government, 1964-1971 -- CHAPTER 9. The Pentagon Papers -- CHAPTER 10. Henry Kissinger -- CHAPTER 11. Diplomats on Foreign Policy, 1976-2001 -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments and Methodological Note -- Index

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In this trenchant analysis, historian Bruce Kuklick examines the role of intellectuals in foreign policymaking. He recounts the history of the development of ideas about strategy and foreign policy during a critical period in American history: the era of the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The book looks at how the country's foremost thinkers advanced their ideas during this time of United States expansionism, a period that culminated in the Vietnam War and détente with the Soviets. Beginning with George Kennan after World War II, and concluding with Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War, Kuklick examines the role of both institutional policymakers such as those at The Rand Corporation and Harvard's Kennedy School, and individual thinkers including Paul Nitze, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Rostow. Kuklick contends that the figures having the most influence on American strategy--Kissinger, for example--clearly understood the way politics and the exercise of power affects policymaking. Other brilliant thinkers, on the other hand, often played a minor role, providing, at best, a rationale for policies adopted for political reasons. At a time when the role of the neoconservatives' influence over American foreign policy is a subject of intense debate, this book offers important insight into the function of intellectuals in foreign policymaking.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021)