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The Ultimate Enemy : British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 / Wesley K. Wark.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2010Description: 1 online resource (304 p.) : 5 charts and graphsContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9781501717079
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 355.3/432/0941
LOC classification:
  • UB251.G7W37 1985
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: Naming the Enemy -- 1. Entering the 1930s—the DRC Report -- 2. Air Force and Aircraft Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 -- 3. The Final Phases in Air Intelligence, 1936-1939 -- 4. Army and Armaments Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 -- 5. The Final Phases in Army Intelligence, 1936-1939 -- 6. Naval Intelligence, 1933-1939 -- 7. The IIC and German Economic Preparations for War -- 8. Four Strategic Appreciations of War against Germany in 1939 -- Conclusion: The Four Phases of Intelligence -- APPENDIXES -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index
Summary: How realistically did the British government assess the threat from Nazi Germany during the 1930s? How accurate was British intelligence's understanding of Hitler's aims and Germany's military and industrial capabilities? In The Ultimate Enemy, Wesley K. Wark catalogues the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence.This book, the product of exhaustive archival research, first looks at the goals of British intelligence in the 1930s. He explains the various views of German power held by the principal Whitehall authorities—including the various military intelligence directorates and the semi-clandestine Industrial Intelligence Centre—and he describes the efforts of senior officials to fit their perceptions of German power into the framework of British military and diplomatic policy. Identifying the four phases through which the British intelligence effort evolved, he assesses its shortcomings and successes, and he calls into question the underlying premises of British intelligence doctrine.Wark shows that faulty intelligence assessments were crucial in shaping the British policy of appeasement up to the outbreak of World War II. His book offers a new perspective on British policy in the interwar period and also contributes a fascinating case study in the workings of intelligence services during a period of worldwide crisis.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781501717079

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: Naming the Enemy -- 1. Entering the 1930s—the DRC Report -- 2. Air Force and Aircraft Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 -- 3. The Final Phases in Air Intelligence, 1936-1939 -- 4. Army and Armaments Industry Intelligence, 1933-1936 -- 5. The Final Phases in Army Intelligence, 1936-1939 -- 6. Naval Intelligence, 1933-1939 -- 7. The IIC and German Economic Preparations for War -- 8. Four Strategic Appreciations of War against Germany in 1939 -- Conclusion: The Four Phases of Intelligence -- APPENDIXES -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index

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How realistically did the British government assess the threat from Nazi Germany during the 1930s? How accurate was British intelligence's understanding of Hitler's aims and Germany's military and industrial capabilities? In The Ultimate Enemy, Wesley K. Wark catalogues the many misperceptions about Nazi Germany that were often fostered by British intelligence.This book, the product of exhaustive archival research, first looks at the goals of British intelligence in the 1930s. He explains the various views of German power held by the principal Whitehall authorities—including the various military intelligence directorates and the semi-clandestine Industrial Intelligence Centre—and he describes the efforts of senior officials to fit their perceptions of German power into the framework of British military and diplomatic policy. Identifying the four phases through which the British intelligence effort evolved, he assesses its shortcomings and successes, and he calls into question the underlying premises of British intelligence doctrine.Wark shows that faulty intelligence assessments were crucial in shaping the British policy of appeasement up to the outbreak of World War II. His book offers a new perspective on British policy in the interwar period and also contributes a fascinating case study in the workings of intelligence services during a period of worldwide crisis.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)