Library Catalog
Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

The Commander's Dilemma : Violence and Restraint in Wartime / Amelia Hoover Green.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2018Description: 1 online resource (276 p.) : 6 b&w halftones, 4 chartsContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9781501726484
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 303.6 23
LOC classification:
  • JC328.6
  • JC328.6 .H67 2019
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: REPERTOIRES AND RESTRAINT -- 1. THE COMMANDER’S DILEMMA -- 2. CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR -- 3. COMPARING STATE AND FMLN INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES -- 4. INSTITUTIONS, IDEOLOGIES, AND COMBATANT EXPERIENCES IN FMLN FACTIONS -- 5. VIOLENCE AND RESTRAINT IN THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR, 1980–92 -- 6. THE COMMANDER’S DILEMMA BEYOND EL SALVADOR -- Conclusion: POLICIES FOR RESTRAINT -- Appendix: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index
Summary: Why do some military and rebel groups commit many types of violence, creating an impression of senseless chaos, whereas others carefully control violence against civilians? A classic catch-22 faces the leaders of armed groups and provides the title for Amelia Hoover Green’s book. Leaders need large groups of people willing to kill and maim—but to do so only under strict control. How can commanders control violence when fighters who are not under direct supervision experience extraordinary stress, fear, and anger? The Commander’s Dilemma argues that discipline is not enough in wartime. Restraint occurs when fighters know why they are fighting and believe in the cause—that is, when commanders invest in political education.Drawing on extraordinary evidence about state and nonstate groups in El Salvador, and extending her argument to the Mano River wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Amelia Hoover Green shows that investments in political education can improve human rights outcomes even where rational incentives for restraint are weak—and that groups whose fighters lack a sense of purpose may engage in massive violence even where incentives for restraint are strong. Hoover Green concludes that high levels of violence against civilians should be considered a "default setting," not an aberration.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781501726484

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: REPERTOIRES AND RESTRAINT -- 1. THE COMMANDER’S DILEMMA -- 2. CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR -- 3. COMPARING STATE AND FMLN INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES -- 4. INSTITUTIONS, IDEOLOGIES, AND COMBATANT EXPERIENCES IN FMLN FACTIONS -- 5. VIOLENCE AND RESTRAINT IN THE SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR, 1980–92 -- 6. THE COMMANDER’S DILEMMA BEYOND EL SALVADOR -- Conclusion: POLICIES FOR RESTRAINT -- Appendix: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Why do some military and rebel groups commit many types of violence, creating an impression of senseless chaos, whereas others carefully control violence against civilians? A classic catch-22 faces the leaders of armed groups and provides the title for Amelia Hoover Green’s book. Leaders need large groups of people willing to kill and maim—but to do so only under strict control. How can commanders control violence when fighters who are not under direct supervision experience extraordinary stress, fear, and anger? The Commander’s Dilemma argues that discipline is not enough in wartime. Restraint occurs when fighters know why they are fighting and believe in the cause—that is, when commanders invest in political education.Drawing on extraordinary evidence about state and nonstate groups in El Salvador, and extending her argument to the Mano River wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Amelia Hoover Green shows that investments in political education can improve human rights outcomes even where rational incentives for restraint are weak—and that groups whose fighters lack a sense of purpose may engage in massive violence even where incentives for restraint are strong. Hoover Green concludes that high levels of violence against civilians should be considered a "default setting," not an aberration.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)