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Flying Blind : The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program / Michael E. Brown.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2019]Copyright date: ©1992Description: 1 online resource (356 p.) : 18 halftonesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9781501733567
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 358.4/283/00973 20
LOC classification:
  • UG1123
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- A Note on Sources -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Historical, Organizational, and Doctrinal Setting -- 3. Building a jet Bomber: The B-45, B-46, B-47, and B-48 -- 4. The First Intercontinental Bombers: The B-35, B-36, B-49, B-52, and B-60 -- 5. The Push to Develop Supersonic Capabilities: The B-58 -- 6. The Nuclear-Powered Bomber and the B-70 -- 7. Low-Altitude Penetration: The B-1 -- 8. The Politics of Stealth: The B-1B and B-2 -- 9. The Origins and Outcomes of Weapon Acquisition Programs -- Appendix: Evolution of U.S. Air Force Weapon Acquisition Organizations -- Index
Summary: Flying Blind offers an astute analysis of the role of organizational forces in initiating and shaping weapons programs. Michael E. Brown concerns himself with how weapons programs begin and why they turn out as they do. In the process he redresses a large imbalance in our understanding of how nations arm themselves.In an unmatched account constructed from massive archival work and material declassified through the Freedom of Information Act, the author provides a detailed description of all fifteen postwar U.S. strategic bomber programs, from the B-35 to the B-2. Challenging the conventional wisdom about arms races and the weapons acquisition process, Brown marshals compelling evidence that Air Force reactions to strategic developments, not technological opportunism or industry initiative, brought about many major innovations in those programs. He also discusses competing explanations of the cost, schedule, and performance problems that plague U.S. acquisition efforts. He maintains that powerful strategic and bureaucratic forces lead American military organizations to set their performance requirements far beyond the state of the art and to push their programs as fast as possible. This, he argues, is a recipe for disaster. Developing a comprehensive explanation of the cost and performance problems that plague modern weapons programs, he presents policy recommendations designed to address these issues.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781501733567

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- A Note on Sources -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Historical, Organizational, and Doctrinal Setting -- 3. Building a jet Bomber: The B-45, B-46, B-47, and B-48 -- 4. The First Intercontinental Bombers: The B-35, B-36, B-49, B-52, and B-60 -- 5. The Push to Develop Supersonic Capabilities: The B-58 -- 6. The Nuclear-Powered Bomber and the B-70 -- 7. Low-Altitude Penetration: The B-1 -- 8. The Politics of Stealth: The B-1B and B-2 -- 9. The Origins and Outcomes of Weapon Acquisition Programs -- Appendix: Evolution of U.S. Air Force Weapon Acquisition Organizations -- Index

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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Flying Blind offers an astute analysis of the role of organizational forces in initiating and shaping weapons programs. Michael E. Brown concerns himself with how weapons programs begin and why they turn out as they do. In the process he redresses a large imbalance in our understanding of how nations arm themselves.In an unmatched account constructed from massive archival work and material declassified through the Freedom of Information Act, the author provides a detailed description of all fifteen postwar U.S. strategic bomber programs, from the B-35 to the B-2. Challenging the conventional wisdom about arms races and the weapons acquisition process, Brown marshals compelling evidence that Air Force reactions to strategic developments, not technological opportunism or industry initiative, brought about many major innovations in those programs. He also discusses competing explanations of the cost, schedule, and performance problems that plague U.S. acquisition efforts. He maintains that powerful strategic and bureaucratic forces lead American military organizations to set their performance requirements far beyond the state of the art and to push their programs as fast as possible. This, he argues, is a recipe for disaster. Developing a comprehensive explanation of the cost and performance problems that plague modern weapons programs, he presents policy recommendations designed to address these issues.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)