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Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism / Fred Wilson.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis ; 22Publisher: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2013]Copyright date: ©2008Description: 1 online resource (512 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9783110326680
  • 9783110327076
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 190 23
LOC classification:
  • B1498
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume’s Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Backmatter
Summary: This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9783110327076

Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume’s Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Backmatter

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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 28. Feb 2023)