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The First-Person Point of View / Wolfgang Carl.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2014]Copyright date: ©2014Description: 1 online resource (198 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9783110359176
  • 9783110379365
  • 9783110362855
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 198.9 23
LOC classification:
  • B4378.S4 C37 2014eb
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. The Use of 'I' Sentences -- 2. Frege on I Thoughts -- 3. Direct Reference -- 4. Epistemic Asymmetry and First-Person Authority -- 5. Authoritative Self-Knowledge -- 6. My Future -- 7. Afterword -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: The interest in a better understanding of what is constitutive for being a person is a concern philosophy shares with some of the sciences. The views currently discussed in evolutionary biology and in the neurosciences are very much influenced by traditional philosophical views about the self and self-knowledge, while contemporary philosophical accounts are not considered at all. Such an account will be given by an analysis of three focal elements of the use of the first-person pronoun. These elements have something to do with the faculty of taking a first-person point of view. The conceptual structure of this point of view is explained by comparing it with a second- and third-person point of view. There is an extensive discussion of various views about self-knowledge (Davidson, Bilgrami, Burge), and a new conception of authoritative self-knowledge is established. The first-person point of view is a reflexive attitude which includes various attitudes to one's past and future. These attitudes are necessarily or contingently de se. By bringing into focus the concern for one's future intentions will be discussed as an activity-based attitude, while there are other attitudes, like hope or fear, which are shaped by the acceptance of one's future situations which are not, or not completely under one's control. This view gives rise to a criticism of Frankfurt's notion of Caring.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9783110362855

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. The Use of 'I' Sentences -- 2. Frege on I Thoughts -- 3. Direct Reference -- 4. Epistemic Asymmetry and First-Person Authority -- 5. Authoritative Self-Knowledge -- 6. My Future -- 7. Afterword -- Bibliography -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

The interest in a better understanding of what is constitutive for being a person is a concern philosophy shares with some of the sciences. The views currently discussed in evolutionary biology and in the neurosciences are very much influenced by traditional philosophical views about the self and self-knowledge, while contemporary philosophical accounts are not considered at all. Such an account will be given by an analysis of three focal elements of the use of the first-person pronoun. These elements have something to do with the faculty of taking a first-person point of view. The conceptual structure of this point of view is explained by comparing it with a second- and third-person point of view. There is an extensive discussion of various views about self-knowledge (Davidson, Bilgrami, Burge), and a new conception of authoritative self-knowledge is established. The first-person point of view is a reflexive attitude which includes various attitudes to one's past and future. These attitudes are necessarily or contingently de se. By bringing into focus the concern for one's future intentions will be discussed as an activity-based attitude, while there are other attitudes, like hope or fear, which are shaped by the acceptance of one's future situations which are not, or not completely under one's control. This view gives rise to a criticism of Frankfurt's notion of Caring.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)