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Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World / Wesley C. Salmon.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2020]Copyright date: ©1985Description: 1 online resource (321 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691221489
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 501 23
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Scientific Explanation: Three General Conceptions -- Introduction -- Explanation versus Description -- Other Types of Explanation -- Laplacian Explanation -- Three Basic Conceptions -- An Outline of Strategy -- 2. Statistical Explanation and Its Models -- Introduction -- Inductive-Statistical Explanation -- The Statistical-Relevance Approach -- 3. Objective Homogeneity -- Epistemic Relativization -- Randomness -- Homogeneity -- Some Philosophical Applications -- Some Philosophical Reflections -- 4. The Three Conceptions Revisited -- The Epistemic Conception -- The Modal Conception -- The Ontic Conception -- How These Conceptions Answer a Fundamental Question -- Conclusions -- 5. Causal Connections -- Basic Problems -- Two Basic Concepts -- Processes -- The 'At-At' Theory of Causal Propagation -- 6. Causal Forks and Common Causes -- Conjunctive Forks -- Interactive Forks -- Relations between Conjunctive and Interactive Forks -- Perfect Forks -- The Causal Structure of the World -- Concluding Remarks -- 7. Probabilistic Causality -- Introduction -- The Sufficiency/Necessity View -- Statistical Relevance and Probabilistic Causality -- Causality and Positive Relevance -- Causal Processes and Propensities -- 8. Theoretical Explanation -- Introduction -- Causal Connections and Common Causes -- Explanatory versus Inferential Principles -- The Common Cause Principle and Molecular Reality -- The Explanatory Power of Theories -- Empiricism and Realism -- 9. The Mechanical Philosophy -- Logic versus Mechanisms -- Explanation in Quantum Mechanics -- Explanation and Understanding -- The Causal/Mechanical Model -- The Final Contrast -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780691221489

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Scientific Explanation: Three General Conceptions -- Introduction -- Explanation versus Description -- Other Types of Explanation -- Laplacian Explanation -- Three Basic Conceptions -- An Outline of Strategy -- 2. Statistical Explanation and Its Models -- Introduction -- Inductive-Statistical Explanation -- The Statistical-Relevance Approach -- 3. Objective Homogeneity -- Epistemic Relativization -- Randomness -- Homogeneity -- Some Philosophical Applications -- Some Philosophical Reflections -- 4. The Three Conceptions Revisited -- The Epistemic Conception -- The Modal Conception -- The Ontic Conception -- How These Conceptions Answer a Fundamental Question -- Conclusions -- 5. Causal Connections -- Basic Problems -- Two Basic Concepts -- Processes -- The 'At-At' Theory of Causal Propagation -- 6. Causal Forks and Common Causes -- Conjunctive Forks -- Interactive Forks -- Relations between Conjunctive and Interactive Forks -- Perfect Forks -- The Causal Structure of the World -- Concluding Remarks -- 7. Probabilistic Causality -- Introduction -- The Sufficiency/Necessity View -- Statistical Relevance and Probabilistic Causality -- Causality and Positive Relevance -- Causal Processes and Propensities -- 8. Theoretical Explanation -- Introduction -- Causal Connections and Common Causes -- Explanatory versus Inferential Principles -- The Common Cause Principle and Molecular Reality -- The Explanatory Power of Theories -- Empiricism and Realism -- 9. The Mechanical Philosophy -- Logic versus Mechanisms -- Explanation in Quantum Mechanics -- Explanation and Understanding -- The Causal/Mechanical Model -- The Final Contrast -- Bibliography -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)