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How Do Proper Names Really Work? : A Metadescriptive Version of the Cluster Theory / Claudio Ferreira-Costa.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Philosophical Analysis ; 88Publisher: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2023]Copyright date: ©2023Description: 1 online resource (XII, 251 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9783110997163
  • 9783110986174
  • 9783110985740
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 100
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- I The true history of descriptivism -- II Inconsistencies of Kripke’s quasi-referentialism -- III Metadescriptivism: Developing a theory -- IV Metadescriptivism: Answering counterexamples -- V Metadescriptivism: Identity statements -- VI Consequences for other terms -- References -- Index
Summary: For fifty years the philosophy of language has been experiencing a stalemating conflict between the old descriptive and internalist orthodoxy (advocated by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle) and the new causal-referential and externalist orthodoxy (mainly endorsed by Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan). Although the latter is dominant among specialists, the former retains a discomforting intuitive plausibility. The ultimate goal of this book is to overcome the stalemate by means of a non-naïve return to the old descriptivist-internalist orthodoxy. Concerning proper names, this means introducing second-order description-rules capable of systemizing descriptions of the proper name’s cluster to provide us with the right changeable conditions of satisfaction for its application. Such rules can explain how a proper name can become a rigid designator while remaining descriptive, disarming Kripke's and Donnellan’s main objections. In the last chapter, this new perspective is extended to indexicals in a discussion of David Kaplan’s and John Perry’s views, and of general terms, in a discussion of Hilary Putnam’s externalism.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- I The true history of descriptivism -- II Inconsistencies of Kripke’s quasi-referentialism -- III Metadescriptivism: Developing a theory -- IV Metadescriptivism: Answering counterexamples -- V Metadescriptivism: Identity statements -- VI Consequences for other terms -- References -- Index

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For fifty years the philosophy of language has been experiencing a stalemating conflict between the old descriptive and internalist orthodoxy (advocated by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle) and the new causal-referential and externalist orthodoxy (mainly endorsed by Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan). Although the latter is dominant among specialists, the former retains a discomforting intuitive plausibility. The ultimate goal of this book is to overcome the stalemate by means of a non-naïve return to the old descriptivist-internalist orthodoxy. Concerning proper names, this means introducing second-order description-rules capable of systemizing descriptions of the proper name’s cluster to provide us with the right changeable conditions of satisfaction for its application. Such rules can explain how a proper name can become a rigid designator while remaining descriptive, disarming Kripke's and Donnellan’s main objections. In the last chapter, this new perspective is extended to indexicals in a discussion of David Kaplan’s and John Perry’s views, and of general terms, in a discussion of Hilary Putnam’s externalism.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)