TY - BOOK AU - Pearlman,Wendy AU - Atzili,Boaz AU - Hoffman,Bruce TI - Triadic Coercion: Israel's Targeting of States That Host Nonstate Actors T2 - Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare SN - 9780231171847 AV - JZ4059 .P437 2018 U1 - 956.05/4 23 PY - 2018///] CY - New York, NY : PB - Columbia University Press, KW - Arab-Israeli conflict KW - International relations KW - Non-state actors (International relations) KW - Security, International KW - POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International) KW - bisacsh N1 - Frontmatter --; COLUMBIA STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND IRREGULAR WARFARE --; Contents --; Map of Israel and the Surrounding Region --; Preface and Acknowledgments --; CHAPTER 1. Understanding Triadic Coercion --; CHAPTER 2. Israel's Use of Triadic Coercion --; CHAPTER 3. Egypt Since 1949 --; CHAPTER 4. Syria Since 1949 --; CHAPTER 5. Israel and the Palestinian Authority Since 1993 --; CHAPTER 6. Lebanon Before and Since 2006 --; CHAPTER 7. Triadic Coercion Beyond the Arab- Israeli Conflict --; Conclusion --; Notes --; Bibliography --; Index; restricted access; Issued also in print N2 - In the post-Cold War era, states increasingly find themselves in conflicts with nonstate actors. Finding it difficult to fight these opponents directly, many governments instead target states that harbor or aid nonstate actors, using threats and punishment to coerce host states into stopping those groups.Wendy Pearlman and Boaz Atzili investigate this strategy, which they term triadic coercion. They explain why states pursue triadic coercion, evaluate the conditions under which it succeeds, and demonstrate their arguments across seventy years of Israeli history. This rich analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supplemented with insights from India and Turkey, yields surprising findings. Traditional discussions of interstate conflict assume that the greater a state's power compared to its opponent, the more successful its coercion. Turning that logic on its head, Pearlman and Atzili show that this strategy can be more effective against a strong host state than a weak one because host regimes need internal cohesion and institutional capacity to move against nonstate actors. If triadic coercion is thus likely to fail against weak regimes, why do states nevertheless employ it against them? Pearlman and Atzili's investigation of Israeli decision-making points to the role of strategic culture. A state's system of beliefs, values, and institutionalized practices can encourage coercion as a necessary response, even when that policy is prone to backfire.A significant contribution to scholarship on deterrence, asymmetric conflict, and strategic culture, Triadic Coercion illuminates an evolving feature of the international security landscape and interrogates assumptions that distort strategic thinking UR - https://doi.org/10.7312/pear17184 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780231548540 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780231548540/original ER -