TY  - BOOK
AU  - Young,H.Peyton
TI  - Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions 
SN  - 9780691214252
U1  - 306 22
PY  - 2020///]
CY  - Princeton, NJ : 
PB  - Princeton University Press, 
KW  - Evolutionary economics
KW  - Game theory
KW  - Institutional economics
KW  - Social institutions
KW  - BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economic History
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - Blume, Larry
KW  - Gibbs distribution
KW  - Hofbauer, Josef
KW  - Hurkens, Sjaak
KW  - Kandori, Michihiro
KW  - Kreps, David
KW  - Levine, David
KW  - Malouf, Michael
KW  - Nash, John
KW  - Owen, Guillermo
KW  - Schumpeter, Joseph
KW  - alternating offers model
KW  - basin of attraction
KW  - chicken game
KW  - disequilibrium
KW  - ergodic process
KW  - fashion game
KW  - finite improvement path
KW  - interpersonal comparisons
KW  - local conformity
KW  - marriage game
KW  - mode of a distribution
KW  - noise models
KW  - payoffs
KW  - proposal game
KW  - risk factor
KW  - roles in a game
KW  - social capital
KW  - successor state
KW  - vector field
N1  - Frontmatter --; CONTENTS --; PREFACE --; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --; Chapter 1. OVERVIEW --; Chapter 2. LEARNING --; Chapter 3. DYNAMIC AND STOCHASTIC STABILITY --; Chapter 4. ADAPTIVE LEARNING IN SMALL GAMES --; Chapter 5. VARIATIONS ON THE LEARNING PROCESS --; Chapter 6 LOCAL INTERACTION --; Chapter 7. EQUILIBRIUM AND DISEQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GENERAL GAMES --; Chapter 8. BARGAINING --; Chapter 9. CONTRACTS --; Chapter 10. CONCLUSION --; Appendix. PROOFS OF SELECTED THEOREMS --; NOTES --; BIBLIOGRAPHY --; INDEX; restricted access
N2  - Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691214252?locatt=mode:legacy
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691214252
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780691214252.jpg
ER  -