TY - BOOK AU - Glennon,Michael J. AU - Fulbright,J.William TI - Constitutional Diplomacy SN - 9780691221915 PY - 2022///] CY - Princeton, NJ : PB - Princeton University Press, KW - POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General KW - bisacsh KW - Berger, Raoul KW - Bernstein exception KW - Boland Amendment KW - Bricker amendment KW - Bumpers amendment KW - Cardozo, Benjamin KW - Charles II KW - Congo rescue mission KW - Connally reservation KW - Dominican Republic KW - Eagleton, Thomas KW - General Accounting Office KW - Grenada KW - Gulf of Tonkin Resolution KW - Hamilton, Alexander KW - Heritage Foundation KW - Honduras KW - Impoundment Control Act KW - Jackson, Robert KW - Japan treaty KW - Korean Airline shoot-down KW - Laos KW - Massachusetts KW - National Security Act of 1947 KW - Niagara Reservation KW - Oxford Union KW - Platt amendment KW - Restatement of Agency KW - Saigon KW - Sandalow, Terry KW - Stewart, Potter KW - actio popularis KW - adverse possession KW - assassination KW - checks and balances KW - confirmation power KW - covert operations KW - custom KW - delegation doctrine KW - dualism KW - emergency presidential powers KW - executive agreements KW - functional analysis KW - judicial review KW - kidnapping KW - legal realism KW - legislative veto KW - nuclear testing KW - passport restrictions KW - rule of recognition KW - third agency rule N1 - Frontmatter --; CONTENTS --; Foreword --; Preface --; Acknowledgments --; Constitutional Diplomacy --; CHAPTER ONE Congress vs. the President --; CHAPTER TWO The Separation-of-Powers Doctrine in Foreign-Affairs Disputes --; CHAPTER THREE The War Power --; CHAPTER FOUR The Treaty Power --; CHAPTER FIVE Presidential Policy and Executive Agreements --; CHAPTER SIX War-making Treaties --; CHAPTER SEVEN International Law as Our Law --; CHAPTER EIGHT National Security: Congressional Oversight and Judicial Review --; APPENDIX A --; APPENDIX B --; General Index --; Index of Cases; restricted access N2 - Challenging those who accept or advocate executive supremacy in American foreign-policy making, Constitutional Diplomacy proposes that we abandon the supine roles often assigned our legislative and judicial branches in that field. This book, by the former Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is the first comprehensive analysis of foreign policy and constitutionalism to appear in over fifteen years. In the interval since the last major work on this theme was published, the War Powers Resolution has ignited a heated controversy, several major treaties have aroused passionate disagreement over the Senate's role, intelligence abuses have been revealed and remedial legislation debated, and the Iran-Contra affair has highlighted anew the extent of disagreement over first principles. Exploring the implications of these and earlier foreign policy disputes, Michael Glennon maintains that the objectives of diplomacy cannot be successfully pursued by discarding constitutional interests. Glennon probes in detail the important foreign-policy responsibilities given to Congress by the Constitution and the duty given to the courts of resolving disputes between Congress and the President concerning the power to make foreign policy. He reviews the scope of the prime tools of diplomacy, the war power and the treaty power, and examines the concept of national security. Throughout the work he considers the intricate weave of two legal systems: American constitutional principles and the international law norms that are part of the U.S. domestic legal system UR - https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691221915?locatt=mode:legacy UR - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780691221915 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780691221915/original ER -