TY - BOOK AU - Kaplow,Louis TI - Competition Policy and Price Fixing SN - 9780691158624 AV - HD41 .K37 2017 U1 - 338.6048 23 PY - 2013///] CY - Princeton, NJ : PB - Princeton University Press, KW - Antitrust law KW - Competition KW - Government policy KW - Droit de la concurrence KW - Fixation des prix KW - Intégration horizontale KW - Politique des prix KW - Preisabsprache KW - Preisregelung KW - Price fixing KW - Wettbewerbsordnung KW - Wettbewerbspolitik KW - Wettbewerbsrecht KW - BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / General KW - bisacsh KW - EU Article 101 KW - European Union KW - Sherman Act Section 1 KW - Supreme Court precedents KW - U.S. antitrust law KW - U.S. lower court KW - adjudication KW - agreement requirement KW - alternative rule KW - burden of proof KW - cheating KW - chilling effects KW - circumstantial evidence KW - classic cartels KW - communication-based prohibition KW - communications technology KW - communications-based prohibition KW - communications KW - competition law KW - competition policy KW - competition rules KW - consumer welfare KW - contrasting approaches KW - conventional prohibition KW - coordinated behavior KW - coordinated oligopoly pricing KW - coordinated price elevation KW - corporate strategy KW - decision-making framework KW - decision-theoretic approach KW - detection KW - deterrence benefits KW - deterrence KW - differentiated products KW - differentiation KW - direct approach KW - game theory KW - homogeneous goods KW - horizontal agreements KW - horizontal-restraints cases KW - indirect approach KW - industry conditions KW - injunctions KW - institutional issues KW - interdependence KW - interdependent coordination KW - interfirm communication KW - interfirm communications KW - internal evidence KW - investigation KW - language KW - liability assessment KW - liability KW - lower courts KW - market behavior KW - market conditions KW - market-based evidence KW - market-based techniques KW - modern competition policy KW - modern oligopoly theory KW - monetary sanctions KW - negative behavioral effects KW - nonprice coordination KW - nonprice terms KW - oligopolies KW - oligopolistic coordination KW - oligopolistic industries KW - oligopolistic price elevation KW - oligopoly behavior KW - oligopoly theory KW - orthodox prohibition KW - paradox of proof KW - polar-opposite cases KW - price coordination KW - price cutting KW - price elevation KW - price fixing KW - price-fixing cases KW - price-fixing prohibition KW - prior scholarship KW - pure interdependence KW - remedies KW - sanctions KW - social welfare consequences KW - social welfare KW - unilateral market power N1 - Frontmatter --; Summary of Contents --; Preface --; 1. Introduction --; Part I: Horizontal Agreements --; 2. Defining the Problem --; 3. Communications --; 4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations --; 5. U.S. Lower Court Practice --; 6. Paradox of Proof --; 7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement --; Part II: Price-Fixing Policy --; 8. Social Welfare --; 9. Framework for Decision-Making --; 10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence --; 11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence --; 12. Liability Assessment --; 13. Sanctions --; 14. Unilateral Market Power --; 15. Additional Considerations --; Part III: Comparison of Approaches --; 16. Communications-Based Prohibition --; 17. Detection of Prohibited Communications --; 18. Further Topics --; 19. Conclusion --; References --; Index; restricted access; Issued also in print N2 - Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply UR - https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400846078?locatt=mode:legacy UR - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400846078 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400846078.jpg ER -