TY  - BOOK
AU  - Schuessler,John M.
TI  - Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy 
T2  - Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
SN  - 9781501701627
AV  - JK558 .S44 2016
U1  - 355.02720973 23
PY  - 2015///]
CY  - Ithaca, NY
PB  - Cornell University Press
KW  - Deception
KW  - Political aspects
KW  - United States
KW  - History
KW  - Iraq War, 2003-2011
KW  - Political leadership
KW  - Politics and war
KW  - Vietnam War, 1961-1975
KW  - World War, 1939-1945
KW  - Political Science & Political History
KW  - U.S. History
KW  - POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - U.S. presidents, leadership, American democracy, American political system, propaganda, information gap, asymmetric information, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush, foreign policy, domestic policy
N1  - Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; Introduction: Democracy and Deception --; 1. Explaining Democratic Deception --; 2. Shifting Blame to the Axis: FDR’s Undeclared War --; 3. Shifting Blame to the Communists: LBJ and the Vietnam War --; 4. Overselling the Iraq War --; Conclusion: Deception and Democracy in International Relations --; Notes --; Index; restricted access
N2  - In Deceit on the Road to War, John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest.When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book—Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War—test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest
UR  - https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501701627
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501701627
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501701627/original
ER  -