TY  - BOOK
AU  - Mearsheimer,John J.
TI  - Conventional Deterrence
T2  - Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
SN  - 9781501713262
U1  - 355.02/17 23
PY  - 1985///]
CY  - Ithaca, NY
PB  - Cornell University Press
KW  - Deterrence (Strategy)
KW  - History
KW  - 20th century
KW  - Military history, Modern
KW  - International Studies
KW  - Political Science & Political History
KW  - POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - arms control
KW  - book on arms control
KW  - causes for war
KW  - crises that lead to war
KW  - deterrence and defense
KW  - deterrence as a strategy
KW  - explaining the causes of war
KW  - game theory
KW  - historical arms control
KW  - international politics theory
KW  - international security
KW  - military deterrence
KW  - military doctrine
KW  - military history
KW  - military science
KW  - military strategies
KW  - military strategy history
KW  - military studies
KW  - military theory
KW  - modern military history
KW  - political consideration for war
KW  - political theory
KW  - starting wars
KW  - strategies of conflict
KW  - study of world politics
KW  - studying the military
KW  - the causes of war
KW  - theory of international politics
KW  - war studies
KW  - what are the origns of war
KW  - what is conventional deterrence
KW  - what is failed deterrence
KW  - what starts wars
KW  - why deterrence fails
N1  - Frontmatter --; Contents --; Preface --; 1. Introduction --; 2. Conventional Deterrence --; 3. The Allied Decision Not to Attack Germany, March 1939-May 1940 --; 4. The German Decision to Attack in the West, 1939-1940 --; 5. Conventional Deterrence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict --; 6. The Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Central Europe --; 7. Precision-Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence --; 8. Conclusion --; Notes --; Select Bibliography --; Index; restricted access
N2  - Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war
UR  - https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713262
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501713262
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501713262/original
ER  -