TY - BOOK AU - Laitinen,Arto TI - Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics T2 - Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie , SN - 9783110204049 AV - B995.T34 L358 2008eb U1 - 191 22 PY - 2008///] CY - Berlin, Boston : PB - De Gruyter, KW - Ethics KW - History KW - 20th century KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Values KW - Ethik KW - Philosophische Anthropologie KW - Taylor, Charles KW - PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern KW - bisacsh KW - Philosophical Anthropology KW - Theories of Selfhood and Personhood KW - Value theory N1 - Frontmatter --; Contents --; Introduction --; 1. What is strong evaluation? A reading and --; reconstruction of Taylor’s central concept --; 2. Human agents as strong evaluators --; 3. Personhood as strongly valued: a strong --; evaluator as an end in itself --; 4. Does identity consist of strong --; evaluations? --; 5. The engaged view and the reality of --; value --; 6. Diversity and universality --; 7. Does moral reality need sources? --; 8. Evaluative beliefs and knowledge --; 9. Moral realism and personal variations --; 10. Conclusion --; Backmatter; restricted access; Issued also in print N2 - Charles Taylor (1931- ) is one of the leading living philosophers. This is the first extended study on the key notions of his views in philosophical anthropology and ethical theory. Firstly, Laitinen clarifies, qualifies and defends Taylor's thesis that transcendental arguments show that personal understandings concerning ethical and other values (so called "strong evaluation") is necessary, in different ways, for human agency, selfhood, identity and personhood. Secondly, Laitinen defends and develops in various ways Taylor's value realism. Finally, the book criticizes Taylor's view that it is necessary to identify and locate a constitutive source of value, such as God, Nature or Human Reason. Taylor relies heavily on this claim in his accounts of moral life, modern identity and, most recently, secularisation. Laitinen argues that the whole notion of constitutive moral source should be dropped – Taylor's views concerning strong evaluation and value realism are distorted by the question of constitutive "moral sources" UR - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110211900 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110211900 UR - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110211900/original ER -