TY  - BOOK
AU  - Ueda,Tomoo
TI  - Telling What She Thinks: Semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude reports 
T2  - Epistemische Studien / Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind ,
SN  - 9783110438802
AV  - P99.4.P72 U33 2015eb
U1  - 160 23
PY  - 2015///]
CY  - Berlin, Boston : 
PB  - De Gruyter, 
KW  - Pragmatics
KW  - Propositional attitudes
KW  - Epistemische Logik
KW  - Frege
KW  - Puzzle
KW  - glauben
KW  - PHILOSOPHY / Movements / Analytic
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - Belief
KW  - Epistemic Modal Logic
N1  - Frontmatter --; Contents --; List of Figures --; List of Tables --; Acknowledgments --; List of abbreviations --; Part I: Introduction --; 1. The central problems --; Part II: State of research --; 2. Structured propositionalism and its shared assumptions --; 3. Indirectness of speech and role of deixis --; 4. Metaphysical status of propositional attitudes --; Part III: Communicational approach --; 5. Communicative framework and discursive opacity --; 6. Opacity as a feature of the frame --; 7. Adverbial account of the frame --; Part IV: The VarCA analysis --; 8. The VarCA Analysis --; 9. Consequences of the opaque VarCA --; Part V: Concluding remarks --; 10. Conclusion --; List of sentences --; Bibliography --; Source of linguistic data --; Index; restricted access; Issued also in print
N2  - Frege’s puzzle concerning belief reports has been in the middle of the discussion on semantics and pragmatics of attitude reports: The intuition behind the opacity does not seem to be consistent with the thesis of semantic innocence according to which the semantic value of proper names is nothing but their referent. Main tasks of this book include providing truth-conditional content of belief reports. Especially, the focus is on semantic values of proper names. The key aim is to extend Crimmins’s basic idea of semantic pretense and the introduction of pleonastic entities proposed by Schiffer. They enable us to capture Frege’s puzzle in the analysis without giving up semantic innocence. To reach this conclusion, two issues are established. First, based on linguistic evidence, the frame of belief reports functions adverbially rather than relationally. Second, the belief ascriptions, on which each belief report is made, must be analyzed in terms of the measurement-theoretic analogy
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110429596
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110429596
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110429596/original
ER  -