TY  - BOOK
AU  - BOK,HILARY
AU  - BOMBOSCH,UWE
AU  - BRANDT,RICHARD Β
AU  - BROOME,JOHN
AU  - CORRADINI,ANTONELLA
AU  - DANIELSSON,SVEN
AU  - FEHIGE,CHRISTOPH
AU  - Fehige,Christoph
AU  - GAUTHIER,DAVID
AU  - GIBBARD,ALLAN
AU  - HARE,RICHARD Μ.
AU  - HEGSELMANN,RAINER
AU  - HINSCH,WILFRIED
AU  - KRAUSE,ULRICH
AU  - KUSSER,ANNA
AU  - KUTSCHERA,FRANZ VON
AU  - LADEN,ANTHONY SIMON
AU  - LENZEN,WOLFGANG
AU  - LUMER,CHRISTOPH
AU  - MCMAHAN,JEFF
AU  - MEGGLE,GEORG
AU  - MILLGRAM,ELIJAH
AU  - NIDA-RÜMELIN,JULIAN
AU  - NORTMANN,ULRICH
AU  - SCHÜSSLER,RUDOLF
AU  - SHOEMAKER,SYDNEY
AU  - SINGER,PETER
AU  - SPITZLEY,THOMAS
AU  - TRAPP,RAINER WERNER
AU  - VELLEMAN,J.DAVID
AU  - WESSELS,ULLA
AU  - WIGGINS,DAVID
AU  - WILLASCHEK,MARCUS
AU  - Wessels,Ulla
AU  - ÅQVIST,LENNART
TI  - Preferences
T2  - Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy
SN  - 9783110159103
AV  - B105.P62 
U1  - 128/.3 
PY  - 2011///]
CY  - Berlin, Boston : 
PB  - De Gruyter, 
KW  - Preferences (Philosophy)
KW  - Congresses
KW  - Philosophie
KW  - Präferenz
KW  - Saarbrücken ‹1992›
KW  - PHILOSOPHY / Ethics & Moral Philosophy
KW  - bisacsh
N1  - I-VI --; Preface --; Contents --; Abstracts --; Introduction --; Preferences - an Introduction --; Preferences - a Short Bibliography --; Part I: Preference and Decision --; Deciding to Desire --; Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram --; Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? --; Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer --; The Rational Criticism of Preferences --; Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt --; Is Motivation Internal to Value? --; Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman --; Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems --; Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson --; Part II: Preference and Metaethics --; Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures --; The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist --; Values and Duties --; Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera --; Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation --; Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek --; In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons --; Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins --; Preference and Preferability --; Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard --; Part III: Preference and Ethics --; Extended Preferences --; Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory --; Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity --; Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann --; The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? --; A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp --; Symposium on Possible Preferences --; Introduction to Possible Preferences --; Possible Preferences --; Preferences of Possible People --; Who Counts? --; Procreation --; Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing --; McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods --; A Pareto Principle for Possible People --; Notes on Contributors --; Name Index --; Subject Index --; 569-570; restricted access; Issued also in print
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110804294
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110804294
UR  - https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110804294/original
ER  -