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Preferences / ed. by Christoph Fehige, Ulla Wessels.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy ; 19Publisher: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2011]Copyright date: ©1998Description: 1 online resource (568 p.) : Num. figsContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9783110159103
  • 9783110804294
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 128/.3
LOC classification:
  • B105.P62
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
I-VI -- Preface -- Contents -- Abstracts -- Introduction -- Preferences - an Introduction -- Preferences - a Short Bibliography -- Part I: Preference and Decision -- Deciding to Desire -- Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram -- Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? -- Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer -- The Rational Criticism of Preferences -- Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt -- Is Motivation Internal to Value? -- Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman -- Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems -- Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson -- Part II: Preference and Metaethics -- Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures -- The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist -- Values and Duties -- Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera -- Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation -- Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek -- In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons -- Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins -- Preference and Preferability -- Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard -- Part III: Preference and Ethics -- Extended Preferences -- Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory -- Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity -- Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann -- The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? -- A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp -- Symposium on Possible Preferences -- Introduction to Possible Preferences -- Possible Preferences -- Preferences of Possible People -- Who Counts? -- Procreation -- Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing -- McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods -- A Pareto Principle for Possible People -- Notes on Contributors -- Name Index -- Subject Index -- 569-570
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9783110804294

I-VI -- Preface -- Contents -- Abstracts -- Introduction -- Preferences - an Introduction -- Preferences - a Short Bibliography -- Part I: Preference and Decision -- Deciding to Desire -- Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram -- Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? -- Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer -- The Rational Criticism of Preferences -- Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt -- Is Motivation Internal to Value? -- Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman -- Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems -- Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson -- Part II: Preference and Metaethics -- Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures -- The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist -- Values and Duties -- Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera -- Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation -- Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek -- In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons -- Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins -- Preference and Preferability -- Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard -- Part III: Preference and Ethics -- Extended Preferences -- Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory -- Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity -- Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann -- The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? -- A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp -- Symposium on Possible Preferences -- Introduction to Possible Preferences -- Possible Preferences -- Preferences of Possible People -- Who Counts? -- Procreation -- Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing -- McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods -- A Pareto Principle for Possible People -- Notes on Contributors -- Name Index -- Subject Index -- 569-570

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jun 2022)