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Moral Hazard in Health Insurance / Amy Finkelstein.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture SeriesPublisher: New York, NY : Columbia University Press, [2014]Copyright date: ©2014Description: 1 online resource (160 p.) : ‹B›Figures: ‹/B›3Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780231163804
  • 9780231538688
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 368.382
LOC classification:
  • HG9383 .F56 2014
  • HG9383
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Moral Hazard in Health Insurance -- Commentary -- Commentary -- Commentary -- Discussion -- Arrow (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care Notes On Contributors -- Notes on Contributors -- Index
Summary: Moral hazard-the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others-is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein-recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic-here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780231538688

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Moral Hazard in Health Insurance -- Commentary -- Commentary -- Commentary -- Discussion -- Arrow (1963): Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care Notes On Contributors -- Notes on Contributors -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Moral hazard-the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others-is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein-recognized as one of the world's foremost experts on the topic-here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)