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The Best Defense : Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s / David Goldfischer.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Cornell Studies in Security AffairsPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2019]Copyright date: ©1993Description: 1 online resource (288 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9781501736681
Subject(s): Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Acronyms -- Introduction -- 1. The Meaning of Offense and Defense -- 2. The Nuclear Policy Stalemate and the Search for Alternatives (1972-1991) -- 3. The Argument for Mutual Defense Emphasis -- 4. Mutual Defense Emphasis in the Bomber Age -- 5. The Origins and Influence of Offense-Only Arms Control Theory (1960-1972) -- 6. Mutual Defense Emphasis in the 1960s -- 7. Strategic Defense without Star Wars: Defense Emphasis in the 1980s and Beyond -- Index
Summary: A fundamental question posed by the demise of the cold war is whether the superpowers' monumentally dangerous and costly arms buildup was necessary. Was it inevitable that the United States and the Soviet Union acquire capabilities to destroy each other in a nuclear war? Or could they have agreed instead to address the nuclear danger through mutual emphasis on defenses? Might such an approach be a feasible option for nuclear powers in today's world?Examining crucial episodes in U.S. security history from the Truman years through the Reagan administration, David Goldfischer considers how figures including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Donald G. Brennan, Freeman Dyson, and Jonathan Schell advanced compelling arguments for seeking an arms control agreement favoring defenses against nuclear attack. Goldfischer offers provocative explanations for why this approach, known as "mutual defense emphasis" (MDE), was rejected in favor of the offense-dominated strategies of nuclear warfighting or "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). The failure seriously to explore MDE, he shows, left supporters of arms control with a false choice between the extremes of MAD and a utopian search for complete nuclear disarmament. Goldfischer concludes with a discussion of how the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (Star Wars)—which used the rhetoric of MDE to mask a renewed search for a nuclear warfighting strategy—has since the 1980s undermined the prospect for serious debate over defense emphasis.Policymakers, activists, political scientists, and scholars and students of security studies and postwar U.S. defense history will welcome this book.
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Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781501736681

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Acronyms -- Introduction -- 1. The Meaning of Offense and Defense -- 2. The Nuclear Policy Stalemate and the Search for Alternatives (1972-1991) -- 3. The Argument for Mutual Defense Emphasis -- 4. Mutual Defense Emphasis in the Bomber Age -- 5. The Origins and Influence of Offense-Only Arms Control Theory (1960-1972) -- 6. Mutual Defense Emphasis in the 1960s -- 7. Strategic Defense without Star Wars: Defense Emphasis in the 1980s and Beyond -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

A fundamental question posed by the demise of the cold war is whether the superpowers' monumentally dangerous and costly arms buildup was necessary. Was it inevitable that the United States and the Soviet Union acquire capabilities to destroy each other in a nuclear war? Or could they have agreed instead to address the nuclear danger through mutual emphasis on defenses? Might such an approach be a feasible option for nuclear powers in today's world?Examining crucial episodes in U.S. security history from the Truman years through the Reagan administration, David Goldfischer considers how figures including J. Robert Oppenheimer, Donald G. Brennan, Freeman Dyson, and Jonathan Schell advanced compelling arguments for seeking an arms control agreement favoring defenses against nuclear attack. Goldfischer offers provocative explanations for why this approach, known as "mutual defense emphasis" (MDE), was rejected in favor of the offense-dominated strategies of nuclear warfighting or "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). The failure seriously to explore MDE, he shows, left supporters of arms control with a false choice between the extremes of MAD and a utopian search for complete nuclear disarmament. Goldfischer concludes with a discussion of how the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (Star Wars)—which used the rhetoric of MDE to mask a renewed search for a nuclear warfighting strategy—has since the 1980s undermined the prospect for serious debate over defense emphasis.Policymakers, activists, political scientists, and scholars and students of security studies and postwar U.S. defense history will welcome this book.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)