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Unmaking the Japanese Miracle : Macroeconomic Politics, 1985–2000 / William M. Grimes.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2002Description: 1 online resource (288 p.) : 4 tables, 7 chartsContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9781501725258
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 339.5/0952 21
LOC classification:
  • HC462.9 .G74 2001
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface to the Cornell Paperbacks Edition Over -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: A Miracle Unmade -- A Note on Japanese Names and Terms -- Abbreviations -- 1. Organizational Conflict -- 2. Institutional Actors -- 3. Macroeconomic Policy Tools -- 4. Plaza-Louvre Period, 1985-87 -- 5. Inflating and Bursting the Bubble, 1988-92 -- 6. Dealing with Stagnation, 1993-97 -- 7. Structural Changes, 1997-2000 -- 8. Conclusions: Fighting the Last War? -- References -- Index
Summary: In recent years, Japan's economy has gone from model of success to object lesson in failure. William W. Grimes offers a richly detailed insider's view of the key macroeconomic policies and events in contemporary Japan, as well as a close examination of the causes and effects of these upheavals. A new preface sets the book's findings in the context of the continuing intensification of Japan's financial woes.It is difficult to believe that the "Bubble Economy" of the late 1980s and the failed attempts at economic stimulation in the following decade both arose from the same policies. In Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, Grimes shows that this is precisely what happened. Focusing less on what went wrong than on why it went wrong, Grimes finds that mistaken macroeconomic policies—loose money in the late 1980s, excessively tight money until 1992, and only grudging use of expansionary fiscal policy until 1998—largely caused Japan's economic problems. Based on scores of interviews with Japanese policymakers, his is the first political explanation of why these catastrophic policies were carried out by the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Diet. Various economic shocks were met, Grimes says, with a consistent and often inappropriate pattern of responses. This pattern has fundamentally altered because of changes within the three policymaking institutions since 1998.
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Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781501725258

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface to the Cornell Paperbacks Edition Over -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: A Miracle Unmade -- A Note on Japanese Names and Terms -- Abbreviations -- 1. Organizational Conflict -- 2. Institutional Actors -- 3. Macroeconomic Policy Tools -- 4. Plaza-Louvre Period, 1985-87 -- 5. Inflating and Bursting the Bubble, 1988-92 -- 6. Dealing with Stagnation, 1993-97 -- 7. Structural Changes, 1997-2000 -- 8. Conclusions: Fighting the Last War? -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

In recent years, Japan's economy has gone from model of success to object lesson in failure. William W. Grimes offers a richly detailed insider's view of the key macroeconomic policies and events in contemporary Japan, as well as a close examination of the causes and effects of these upheavals. A new preface sets the book's findings in the context of the continuing intensification of Japan's financial woes.It is difficult to believe that the "Bubble Economy" of the late 1980s and the failed attempts at economic stimulation in the following decade both arose from the same policies. In Unmaking the Japanese Miracle, Grimes shows that this is precisely what happened. Focusing less on what went wrong than on why it went wrong, Grimes finds that mistaken macroeconomic policies—loose money in the late 1980s, excessively tight money until 1992, and only grudging use of expansionary fiscal policy until 1998—largely caused Japan's economic problems. Based on scores of interviews with Japanese policymakers, his is the first political explanation of why these catastrophic policies were carried out by the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Diet. Various economic shocks were met, Grimes says, with a consistent and often inappropriate pattern of responses. This pattern has fundamentally altered because of changes within the three policymaking institutions since 1998.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)