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The Origins of Liberty : Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World / ed. by Mathew D. McCubbins, Paul W. Drake.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2022]Copyright date: ©1998Description: 1 online resource (224 p.) : 23 tables 5 line illusContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691227894
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 323.44 21
LOC classification:
  • JC585
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Contributors -- 1. The Origins of Liberty -- 2. Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to "Constitutions and Commitment" -- 3. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England -- 4. Democracy, Capital, Skill, and Country Size: Effects of Asset Mobility and Regime Monopoly on the Odds of Democratic Rule -- 5. The International Causes of Democratization, 1974-1990 -- 6. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Withdrawals -- 7. When You Wish upon the Stars: Why the Generals (and Admirals) Say Yes to Latin American "Transitions" to Civilian Government -- 8. Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World -- 9. Afterword -- References -- Index
Summary: Why would sovereigns ever grant political or economic liberty to their subjects? Under what conditions would rational rulers who possess ultimate authority and who seek to maximize power and wealth ever give up any of that authority? This book draws on a wide array of empirical and theoretical approaches to answer these questions, investigating both why sovereign powers might liberalize and when. The contributors to this volume argue that liberalization or democratization will only occur when those in power calculate that the expected benefits to them will exceed the costs. More specifically, rulers take five main concerns into account in their cost-benefit analysis as they decide to reinforce or relax controls: personal welfare, personal power, internal order, external order, and control over policy--particularly economic policy. The book shows that repression is a tempting first option for rulers seeking to maximize their benefits, but that liberalization becomes more attractive as a means of minimizing losses when it becomes increasingly certain that the alternatives are chaos, deposition, or even death. Chapters cover topics as diverse as the politics of seventeenth-century England and of twentieth-century Chile; why so many countries have liberalized in recent decades; and why even democratic governments see a need to reduce state power. The book makes use of formal modeling, statistical analysis, and traditional historical analysis. The contributors are Paul Drake, Stephen Haggard, William Heller, Robert Kaufman, Phil Keefer, Brian Loveman, Mathew McCubbins, Douglass North, Ronald Rogowski, and Barry Weingast.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780691227894

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Contributors -- 1. The Origins of Liberty -- 2. Limited Government and Liberal Markets: An Introduction to "Constitutions and Commitment" -- 3. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England -- 4. Democracy, Capital, Skill, and Country Size: Effects of Asset Mobility and Regime Monopoly on the Odds of Democratic Rule -- 5. The International Causes of Democratization, 1974-1990 -- 6. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Withdrawals -- 7. When You Wish upon the Stars: Why the Generals (and Admirals) Say Yes to Latin American "Transitions" to Civilian Government -- 8. Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World -- 9. Afterword -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Why would sovereigns ever grant political or economic liberty to their subjects? Under what conditions would rational rulers who possess ultimate authority and who seek to maximize power and wealth ever give up any of that authority? This book draws on a wide array of empirical and theoretical approaches to answer these questions, investigating both why sovereign powers might liberalize and when. The contributors to this volume argue that liberalization or democratization will only occur when those in power calculate that the expected benefits to them will exceed the costs. More specifically, rulers take five main concerns into account in their cost-benefit analysis as they decide to reinforce or relax controls: personal welfare, personal power, internal order, external order, and control over policy--particularly economic policy. The book shows that repression is a tempting first option for rulers seeking to maximize their benefits, but that liberalization becomes more attractive as a means of minimizing losses when it becomes increasingly certain that the alternatives are chaos, deposition, or even death. Chapters cover topics as diverse as the politics of seventeenth-century England and of twentieth-century Chile; why so many countries have liberalized in recent decades; and why even democratic governments see a need to reduce state power. The book makes use of formal modeling, statistical analysis, and traditional historical analysis. The contributors are Paul Drake, Stephen Haggard, William Heller, Robert Kaufman, Phil Keefer, Brian Loveman, Mathew McCubbins, Douglass North, Ronald Rogowski, and Barry Weingast.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jun 2022)