The Logic of Historical Explanation / Clayton Roberts.
Material type:
TextPublisher: University Park, PA : Penn State University Press, [1995]Copyright date: 1996Description: 1 online resource (332 p.)Content type: - 9780271097657
- 901 20
- D16.9 .R57 1996
- online - DeGruyter
| Item type | Current library | Call number | URL | Status | Notes | Barcode | |
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eBook
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Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online | online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Online access | Not for loan (Accesso limitato) | Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users | (dgr)9780271097657 |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 THE FAILURE OF MACROCORRELATION -- 2 THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF COLLIGATION -- 3 THE NECESSITY OF MICROCORRELATION -- 4 THE NATURE OF COVERING LAWS -- 5 THE PROBLEM OF INDISCRIMINATE PLURALISM -- 6 THE LOGIC OF COLLIGATION -- 7 STRUCTURE AND THEORY IN HISTORY -- 8 PURPOSIVE ACTION -- 9 THE ETIOLOGY OF DESIRE -- 10 THE ETIOLOGY OF BELIEF -- 11 THE LOGIC OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION -- 12 CAUSAL EXPLANATION AND THE USES OF HISTORY -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index
restricted access online access with authorization star
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Ever since 1942, when Carl Hempel declared that historical events are explained by subsuming them under laws governing the occurrence of similar events, philosophers have debated the validity of explanations based on "covering laws." In The Logic of Historical Explanation, Clayton Roberts provides a key to understanding the role of covering laws in historical explanation. He does so by distinguishing between their use at the macro- and micro- levels, a distinction that no other scholar has made. Roberts contends that the positivists were right to believe that covering laws are indispensable in historical explanations but wrong to think that these laws apply to macro-events (such as wars and revolutions). Similarly, the humanists were right to declare that historians do not explain the occurrence of macro-events by subsuming them under covering laws but wrong to deny the role of covering laws in tracing the course of events leading to the macro-event. Roberts resolves this debate by showing that, though useless in explaining macro-events, covering laws are indispensable in connecting the steps in an explanatory narrative. He then sets forth the logic of an explanatory narrative, explores the nature of rational explanation, and distinguishes the logic of historical interpretation from the logic of historical explanation.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Aug 2024)

