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Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries / Michael Tomz.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2012]Copyright date: ©2008Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (328 p.) : 16 line illus. 27 tablesContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691134697
  • 9781400842926
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 336.3/43509 22
LOC classification:
  • HG3891.5 .T66 2007
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Preface -- PART ONE: THEORY -- Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt -- Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation -- PART TWO: EVIDENCE -- Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers -- Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion -- Chapter 5. Reputations during Good Times and Bad -- Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats -- Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions -- Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation -- PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS -- Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy -- Bibliography -- Index
Summary: How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400842926

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Figures -- Preface -- PART ONE: THEORY -- Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt -- Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation -- PART TWO: EVIDENCE -- Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers -- Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion -- Chapter 5. Reputations during Good Times and Bad -- Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats -- Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions -- Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation -- PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS -- Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy -- Bibliography -- Index

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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021)