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We All Lost the Cold War / Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics ; 55Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [1995]Copyright date: ©1995Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (566 p.)Content type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691019413
  • 9781400821082
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 327.7304709045
LOC classification:
  • D849 .L425 2001
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ABBREVIATIONS -- CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 -- CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973 -- CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR -- CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- NOTES -- APPENDIX -- NAME INDEX -- GENERAL INDEX
Summary: Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400821082

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ABBREVIATIONS -- CHAPTER ONE Introduction -- PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 -- CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives -- CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics -- CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate? -- CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis? -- CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973 -- CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973 -- CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts -- CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting -- CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation -- CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution -- PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR -- CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management -- CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons -- POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War -- NOTES -- APPENDIX -- NAME INDEX -- GENERAL INDEX

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2022)