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Competition Policy and Price Fixing / Louis Kaplow.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2013]Copyright date: ©2013Edition: Course BookDescription: 1 online resource (512 p.) : 25 line illusContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691158624
  • 9781400846078
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338.6048 23
LOC classification:
  • HD41 .K37 2017
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Issued also in print.
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Summary of Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Part I: Horizontal Agreements -- 2. Defining the Problem -- 3. Communications -- 4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations -- 5. U.S. Lower Court Practice -- 6. Paradox of Proof -- 7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement -- Part II: Price-Fixing Policy -- 8. Social Welfare -- 9. Framework for Decision-Making -- 10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence -- 11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence -- 12. Liability Assessment -- 13. Sanctions -- 14. Unilateral Market Power -- 15. Additional Considerations -- Part III: Comparison of Approaches -- 16. Communications-Based Prohibition -- 17. Detection of Prohibited Communications -- 18. Further Topics -- 19. Conclusion -- References -- Index
Summary: Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9781400846078

Frontmatter -- Summary of Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Part I: Horizontal Agreements -- 2. Defining the Problem -- 3. Communications -- 4. Statutory Provisions and Higher Court Interpretations -- 5. U.S. Lower Court Practice -- 6. Paradox of Proof -- 7. Oligopoly Theory and the Agreement Requirement -- Part II: Price-Fixing Policy -- 8. Social Welfare -- 9. Framework for Decision-Making -- 10. Detection: Market-Based Evidence -- 11. Detection: Other Types of Evidence -- 12. Liability Assessment -- 13. Sanctions -- 14. Unilateral Market Power -- 15. Additional Considerations -- Part III: Comparison of Approaches -- 16. Communications-Based Prohibition -- 17. Detection of Prohibited Communications -- 18. Further Topics -- 19. Conclusion -- References -- Index

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Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.

Issued also in print.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)