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008 220302t20142014nyu fo d z eng d
010 _a2014008130
019 _a(OCoLC)1024051220
019 _a(OCoLC)1029831177
019 _a(OCoLC)1032678676
019 _a(OCoLC)1037969547
019 _a(OCoLC)1041973056
019 _a(OCoLC)1046622001
019 _a(OCoLC)1046995292
019 _a(OCoLC)1049610845
019 _a(OCoLC)1054871480
020 _a9780231169400
_qprint
020 _a9780231538343
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.7312/gunn16940
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780231538343
035 _a(DE-B1597)458344
035 _a(OCoLC)979751966
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
050 0 0 _aH61.15
_b.G86 2014
050 4 _aH61.15
_b.G86 2015
072 7 _aPHI019000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a300.1
_223
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aGunnell, John
_eautore
245 1 0 _aSocial Inquiry After Wittgenstein and Kuhn :
_bLeaving Everything as It Is /
_cJohn Gunnell.
264 1 _aNew York, NY :
_bColumbia University Press,
_c[2014]
264 4 _c©2014
300 _a1 online resource (280 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_tPreface --
_tAbbreviations --
_tIntroduction --
_t1. Thomas Kuhn & the Shadow of Wittgenstein --
_t2. Wittgenstein & Social Theory --
_t3. Mind, Meaning, & Interpretation --
_t4. Investigating the Investigations --
_t5. Conventional Objects, Concepts, & the Practice of Interpretation --
_t6. Interpreting Science: Kuhn as a Social Theorist --
_t7. Wittgenstein on the Moon: Certainty, Truth, & Value --
_tReferences --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aA distinctive feature of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work after 1930 was his turn to a conception of philosophy as a form of social inquiry, John G. Gunnell argues, and Thomas Kuhn's approach to the philosophy of science exemplified this conception. In this book, Gunnell shows how these philosophers address foundational issues in the social and human sciences, particularly the vision of social inquiry as an interpretive endeavor and the distinctive cognitive and practical relationship between social inquiry and its subject matter.Gunnell speaks directly to philosophers and practitioners of the social and human sciences. He tackles the demarcation between natural and social science; the nature of social phenomena; the concept and method of interpretation; the relationship between language and thought; the problem of knowledge of other minds; and the character of descriptive and normative judgments about practices that are the object of inquiry. Though Wittgenstein and Kuhn are often criticized as initiating a modern descent into relativism, this book shows that the true effect of their work was to undermine the basic assumptions of contemporary social and human science practice. It also problematized the authority of philosophy and other forms of social inquiry to specify the criteria for judging such matters as truth and justice. When Wittgenstein stated that "philosophy leaves everything as it is," he did not mean that philosophy would be left as it was or that philosophy would have no impact on what it studied, but rather that the activity of inquiry did not, simply by virtue of its performance, transform the object of inquiry.
530 _aIssued also in print.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 02. Mrz 2022)
650 0 _aKuhn, Thomas S.
650 0 _aSocial sciences
_xPhilosophy.
650 7 _aPHILOSOPHY / Political.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.7312/gunn16940
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780231538343
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780231538343/original
942 _cEB
999 _c183787
_d183787