000			05331nam a22007335i 4500
001			187160
003			IT-RoAPU
005			20221214232312.0
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007			cr || ||||||||
008			211129t20212009pau fo d z eng d
020			_a9780271058818 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.1515/9780271058818 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9780271058818
035			_a(DE-B1597)583666
035			_a(OCoLC)1269268879
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aKH917 _b.B47 2009
072		7	_aPOL009000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a345.82/02338 _222
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aBergman, Marcelo _eautore
245	1	0	_aTax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America : _bThe Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile / _cMarcelo Bergman.
264		1	_aUniversity Park, PA : _bPenn State University Press, _c[2021]
264		4	_c©2009
300			_a1 online resource (280 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tCONTENTS -- _tFIGURES AND TABLES -- _tPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- _tIntroduction -- _t1 Compliance and enforcement -- _t2 Measuring tax compliance in Chile and Argentina -- _t3 Taxpayers' perceptions of government enforcement -- _t4 General deterrence: impunity and sanctions in taxation -- _t5 Specific deterrence and its effects on individual compliance -- _t6 The role of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity in tax compliance -- _t7 Social mechanisms in tax evasion and tax compliance -- _tConclusion: tax compliance and the law -- _tAppendix a: on the data -- _tAppendix b: a game theory approach to the logic of tax compliance -- _tAppendix c: a simulative game: the effects of enforcement -- _tAppendix d: the state, the law, and the rule of law -- _tREFERENCES -- _tINDEX
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aFew tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation.In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of ";free riding,"; which arises when cheaters can count on enough suckers to pay their taxes so they can avoid doing so and still benefit from the government's supply of public goods, cannot be reversed just by stringent law, because the success of governmental enforcement ultimately depends on the social equilibrium that predominates in each country. Culture and state effectiveness are inherently linked.Using a wealth of new data drawn from his own multidimensional research involving game theory, statistical models, surveys, and simulations, Bergman compares Argentina and Chile to show how, in two societies that otherwise share much in common, the differing traditions of rule of law explain why so many citizens evade paying taxes in Argentina-and why, in Chile, most citizens comply with the law. In the concluding chapter, he draws implications for public policy from the empirical findings and generalizes his argument to other societies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Nov 2021)
650		0	_aTax administration and procedure _xArgentina.
650		0	_aTax administration and procedure _xChile.
650		0	_aTax administration and procedure _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTax administration and procedure _zChile.
650		0	_aTax evasion _xArgentina.
650		0	_aTax evasion _xChile.
650		0	_aTax evasion _xLaw and legislation _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTax evasion _xLaw and legislation _zChile.
650		0	_aTax evasion _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTax evasion _zChile.
650		0	_aTaxation _xLaw and legislation _xArgentina.
650		0	_aTaxation _xLaw and legislation _xChile _xArgentina _xArgentinien.
650		0	_aTaxation _xLaw and legislation _xChile _xArgentina _xChile _xArgentinien.
650		0	_aTaxation _xLaw and legislation _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTaxation _xLaw and legislation _zChile.
650		0	_aTaxation _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTaxation _zChile.
650		0	_aTaxpayer compliance _xArgentina.
650		0	_aTaxpayer compliance _xChile.
650		0	_aTaxpayer compliance _zArgentina.
650		0	_aTaxpayer compliance _zChile.
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics. _2bisacsh
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1515/9780271058818?locatt=mode:legacy
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780271058818
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9780271058818/original
942			_cEB
999			_c187160 _d187160