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001			189533
003			IT-RoAPU
005			20221214232444.0
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007			cr || ||||||||
008			210830t20092005mau fo d z eng d
019			_a(OCoLC)1049624422
019			_a(OCoLC)1054878018
020			_a9780674036772 _qPDF
024	7		_a10.4159/9780674036772 _2doi
035			_a(DE-B1597)9780674036772
035			_a(DE-B1597)457613
035			_a(OCoLC)979721324
040			_aDE-B1597 _beng _cDE-B1597 _erda
050		4	_aJK330 -- F43 2003eb
072		7	_aPOL000000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a322.50973
084			_aonline - DeGruyter
100	1		_aFeaver, Peter D. _eautore
245	1	0	_aArmed Servants : _bAgency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations / _cPeter D. Feaver.
264		1	_aCambridge, MA : _bHarvard University Press, _c[2009]
264		4	_c©2005
300			_a1 online resource (400 p.)
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tContents -- _tPreface -- _tCHAPTER 1. Introduction -- _tCHAPTER 2. Huntington’s Cold War Puzzle -- _tCHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory -- _tCHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations -- _tCHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle -- _tCHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post–Cold War “Crisis,” 1990–2000 -- _tCHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post–Cold War Era -- _tCHAPTER 8. Conclusion -- _tNotes -- _tReferences -- _tIndex
506	0		_arestricted access _uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec _fonline access with authorization _2star
520			_aHow do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
538			_aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650		0	_aCivil supremacy over the military _zUnited States.
650		0	_aCivil-military relations _zUnited States.
650		0	_aElectronic books _vlocal.
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / General. _2bisacsh
850			_aIT-RoAPU
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/9780674036772
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674036772
856	4	2	_3Cover _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674036772.jpg
942			_cEB
999			_c189533 _d189533