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008 210830t20211998mau fo d z eng d
020 _a9780674043664
_qPDF
024 7 _a10.4159/9780674043664
_2doi
035 _a(DE-B1597)9780674043664
035 _a(DE-B1597)574358
035 _a(OCoLC)1262307956
040 _aDE-B1597
_beng
_cDE-B1597
_erda
072 7 _aLAW036000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a174.3
084 _aonline - DeGruyter
100 1 _aSimon, William H.
_eautore
245 1 4 _aThe Practice of Justice :
_bA Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics /
_cWilliam H. Simon.
264 1 _aCambridge, MA :
_bHarvard University Press,
_c[2021]
264 4 _c©1998
300 _a1 online resource (265 p.)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 0 _tFrontmatter --
_tContents --
_t1 Introduction --
_t2 A Right to Injustice --
_t3 Justice in the Long Run --
_t4 Should Lawyers 0 bey the Law? --
_t5 Legal Professionalism as Meaningful Work --
_t6 Legal Ethics as Contextual Judgment --
_t7 Is Criminal Defense Different? --
_t8 Institutionalizing Ethics --
_tNotes --
_tFurther Reading --
_tAcknowledgments --
_tIndex
506 0 _arestricted access
_uhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
_fonline access with authorization
_2star
520 _aShould a lawyer keep a client's secrets even when disclosure would exculpate a person wrongly accused of a crime? To what extent should a lawyer exploit loopholes in ways that enable clients to gain unintended advantages? When can lawyers justifiably make procedural maneuvers that defeat substantive rights? The Practice of Justice is a fresh look at these and other traditional questions about the ethics of lawyering. William Simon, a legal theorist with extensive experience in practice, charges that the profession's standard approach to these questions is incoherent and implausible. At the same time, Simon rejects the ethical approaches most frequently proposed by the profession's critics. The problem, he insists, does not lie in the profession's commitment to legal values over those of ordinary morality. Nor does it arise from the adversary system. Rather, Simon shows that the critical weakness of the standard approach is its reliance on a distinctive style of judgment--categorical, rule-bound, rigid--that is both ethically unattractive and rejected by most modern legal thought outside the realm of legal ethics. He develops an alternative approach based on a different, more contextual, style of judgment widely accepted in other areas of legal thought. The author enlivens his argument with discussions of actual cases, including the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal and the Leo Frank murder trial, as well as fictional accounts of lawyering, including Kafka's The Trial and the movie The Verdict.
538 _aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
546 _aIn English.
588 0 _aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
650 0 _aAvocats
_xDéontologie
_xPhilosophie
_xÉtats-Unis
_xUnited States.
650 0 _aDroit
_xPratique
_xPhilosophie
_xÉtats-Unis.
650 0 _aLegal ethics
_xPhilosophy
_xUnited States.
650 0 _aLegal ethics
_zUnited States
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aPractice of law
_xPhilosophy
_xUnited States.
650 0 _aPractice of law
_zUnited States
_xPhilosophy.
650 7 _aLAW / Ethics & Professional Responsibility.
_2bisacsh
850 _aIT-RoAPU
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.4159/9780674043664
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674043664
856 4 2 _3Cover
_uhttps://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674043664.jpg
942 _cEB
999 _c189929
_d189929